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Executive Summary
CMVIS is a leading mine/UXO casualty collection system in the world. Its work has been
reported on in studies of the Mine Action Information Centre at James Madison University and
those conducted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). A
simple web search for CMVIS gives 38 hits. The data is used for a wide variety of purposes,
provides information to a broad end-user group and it is well respected by humanitarian mine
action agencies (HMA) and victim assistance (VA) agencies, Cambodian Mine Action and
Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), Mine Action Planning Units 1 (MAPUs), donors and
embassies in Cambodia. All consider CMVIS to be the most reliable source of mine/UXO
casualty data in the country.
The data is obtained through an elaborate chain of operations that begins with an expansive
volunteer network at the community level and ends with the dissemination of the data to the endusers. Data collection practices are thorough, but could benefit from more organized crosschecking practices with external sources. There are no such sources with which to check whether
the data CMVIS collects is accurate, but there are a number of sources that CMVIS does not use
that could inform whether the data is complete. These include other projects such as the
Community-based Mine/UXO Risk Reduction (CBMRR) project, the Mine Action Planning
Units (MAPUs) and the Provincial Rehabilitation Centers (PRC). Based on current operations,
the data CMVIS collects is mostly accurate, although the reliability and consistency of the
incident 2 location is an area in need of much improvement. As MAPU and CMAA currently are
the main end-users of incident location data, suggestions for improvement received much input
from these two end-users.
The conduct of this evaluation brings the project to a cross-roads; either it continues as it has with
the consequence that, with some relatively minor improvements, it is as good as it is going to get,
OR it sets a clear direction for the future that would allow it to evolve and better fit with the
changing character of mine action in Cambodia. The latter depends largely on the setting of a
clear strategic direction by Handicap International Belgium (HI-B), its partner, the Cambodian
Red Cross (CRC) and CMVIS.
HI-B and the CRC have been partners in supporting the project for the past ten years, but not yet
formulated a clear strategic direction for their role in the project. This partnership is formally
endorsed on an annual basis by way of signing a Memorandum of Understanding, but otherwise
has not been strengthened by means of building relationships of mutual trust and capacity
building. The CRC, for its part, appears keen to have the project under its umbrella, yet has done
very little to indicate its interest in increasing its involvement in the project. And HI-B, for its
part, has changed its views on its role in the project. Whereas it planned handing over the project
to the CRC in 2001 3, this did not occur. And although the deliverables for this evaluation
included the provision of a road map leading to a partial or complete withdraw of HI-B technical
1

MAPU gather data on behalf of, and report to, PMAC, who ultimately approve the provincial Mine clearance
annual work plan based on the information provided by MAPU. PMAC is the provincial government body in charge
of the mine clearance planning process.
2
This report will use the term ‘incident’ to describe the event in which a landmine/UXO explodes unexpectedly.
3
UNICEF External Evaluation of Supported Mine Action Projects, July 2000.
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assistance, this changed during the course of the evaluation to HI-B’s current stance which is one
of being undecided about what role it will play in the project in the longer term.
The lack of clear direction for the future of the project acts as a significant barrier to the project’s
evolution. Whereas the recommendations outlined in the first and third section of this report can
be implemented immediately, the relevancy of all those listed in the second and some of those in
the fourth section depends largely on the future direction of the project.
Two options for CMVIS’ future appear to be on the horizon. One option that is discussed outside
the mine action community is for CMVIS to become part of a wider injury surveillance system.
The other option is talked about inside the mine action community, which is for CMVIS to stay
operationally as it is but with closer links to the CMAA. The latter is only seen as an option if the
CMAA shows it is capable of the leadership role it is mandated with. Both options can exist side
by side; CMVIS can become part of a wider injury surveillance system 4 by collecting data on a
wide range of injures, and at the same work more directly with the CMAA.
The forging of a closer relationship between CMVIS and CMAA appears particularly suitable
with the anticipated implementation by CMAA of IMSMA4. IMSMA4 would not replace the
CMVIS data base 5, but act as portal by which CMVIS data can be shared more readily. The
availability of all mine action related information in one data base would significantly aid
management of mine action information. A closer relationship with the authority would also
facilitate their joint conduct of a meta-analysis of the data embedded in the data base. For this
purpose, it may be beneficial to establish a Mine Action Data Analysis Committee that is
comprised of CMAA, CMVIS and representatives of the various mine action operators such as
the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), HALO, Mines Advisory Group (MAG).
In sum, from a strategic point of view, CMVIS has more than one option. Before pursuing any
one of these and possible other options, it would be most beneficial for both partners and CMVIS
to decide on a strategic direction for the project in the future, conduct the necessary research,
design a strategic plan, outline activities and monitor for the results of these activities.
Direction for the day to day operations of the project is blurred due to incongruence between the
log frame and field activities and the primary outputs and overall goal stated in formal proposals
and reports. This concerns particularly the role of CMVIS as an advocate. If CMVIS, as stated, is
to contribute to the overall goal of reducing mine/UXO casualties and to the cessation of
mine/UXO impact on affected communities, it will need to take on an advocacy role. Yet, this
will likely compromise its neutrality as an independent, transparent source, as one without a
conflict of interest.

4

This evaluation did not assess the feasibility of CMVIS becoming part of a wider injury surveillance system and
will therefore not comment on this option.
5
IMSMA4 was designed in response to lengthy field tests of the previous system. IMSMA4 is more intuitive in
design and acts as a shell that is customizable. Fields can be added and key information can be imported. For
CMVIS, IMSMA4 can act as a portal with import – export functionality. Importing CMVIS data on key information
fields would allow for sharing CMVIS data more broadly and readily. End-users would still approach CMVIS for
additional information not contained by IMSMA4.

2

CMVIS and HI-B therefore need to decide if and to what degree and in which areas it wants to
play an advocacy role. If CMVIS decides it does not want to be an advocate for mine action, it
needs to revise the primary outputs and overall goal it describes in its proposals and reports, as it
would be unrealistic for CMVIS to achieve described results without taking on an advocacy role.
If CMVIS decides it does want to play the role of advocate, it needs to revise its log frame to
include results indicators that are then used by management and monitoring staff to direct the
project. This would enable to project’s activities to gain significant momentum and ultimately,
achieve greater results, yet at the same time, would compromise its much valued independence.
Whereas the role of CMVIS as an advocate for mine action is seen as potentially controversial, its
role as advocate for mine victims is not. One of the project’s main activities is the provision of
victim assistance (VA) and the role of advocate fits quite well within this role. Advocacy for
mine victims would include the forging of linkages with VA and other NGOs that provide
support to victims; ensuring services are made available by following up; speaking on behalf of
the victim if needed; and, to analyze the casualty data to better understand for example which
types of disability do, and which ones generally don’t, receive services. Because the conduct of
advocacy for mine/UXO casualties is not seen as a compromise to its neutrality, CMVIS can
immediately begin to strengthen its victim assistance role by being an advocate for victims.
Lastly, CMVIS’ main end-users (mine action agencies, CMAA and MAPUs) are generally
pleased with the work of CVMVIS. The project’s response time to special requests is improving,
but end-users that make the same special request on a regular basis repeatedly need to prompt
project staff to provide them with the information. End-user would be better served if CMVIS
designed an automated system to store and be reminded these regular special requests.
CMVIS could also better meet the needs of its end users if it solicited their feedback about ways
in which to improve the system and if it collected more accurate incident location information.
To increase the uptake of the information CMVIS collects and to facilitate greater interpretation,
CMVIS is recommended to promote the use of OLAP-Cubes 6 to HMA end-users. This would not
only decrease the workload of the former but better serve the information needs of the latter.
In closing, CMVIS has stood up to the test of time and for ten years has been providing reliable
high quality casualty data that is much valued by a diverse group of end-users. With some
renewed strategic direction from HI-B, CRC and CMVIS, clarification of its mandate and a
stronger relationship with the Cambodian partner, whether this be CRC, CMAA or another
institution, CMVIS will be even better able to meet the needs of its end-users and to provide
much-needed assistance to mine/UXO casualties.

6

OLAP-Cubes: Online Analytical Processing: Excel system that allows users to manipulate data in a number of
categories in whatever configuration they choose.
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PART A – Evaluation Framework
1. INTRODUCTION
This document presents a draft evaluation framework and methodology for the external
evaluation of the Cambodian Mine-UXO Victim Information System (CMVIS). This evaluation
was planned by Handicap International Belgium (HI-B) and is to take place from January 16th
2006 through until March 23rd 2006. The purpose of writing this document is two-fold: 1) to
verify the evaluator fully understands the Terms of Reference (TOR), and 2) to enable all parties
involved, i.e., HI-B, Cambodian Red Cross (CRC), and CMVIS to provide input into the way in
which this evaluation is conducted. It therefore aims to act as a discussion piece, upon which the
final framework for this evaluation will be based.
As part of the evaluation framework, the project is briefly described, as well as the environment
within which the project currently operates. This environment simultaneously forms the external
context of the evaluation. The justification for the evaluation is given, as are the purpose and
objectives of the evaluation. Next, each objective is discussed separately by posing one key
question that aims to capture the objective as well as a series of sub-questions that indicate the
various ways in which this key question can be pursued. The content of this evaluation will
depend on which of these sub-questions are selected. Although the questions aim to be complete,
it is likely that some questions that need to be asked are not yet listed. New questions can be
added in the process of finalizing the framework. The questions listed aim to invite critical
feedback from the various parties. This feedback will then be incorporated and the final
evaluation framework established. One this has been done, a plan of action for the evaluation will
be drafted and the evaluation conducted.
This document also provides a brief overview of the conceptual framework guiding the
evaluation; and briefly describes evaluation methods and expected outputs as stated the TOR
(11/10/05). Feedback related to any aspect of this evaluation will be integrated into the
framework, which ultimately will inform the content and type of recommendations of this
evaluation.

2. BRIEF PROJECT DESCRIPTION
CMVIS maintains a national data-gathering network and system for the storage and
dissemination of information related to mine/UXO casualties in Cambodia. CMVIS is a
partnership of Handicap International Belgium (HI-B) and the CRC. The Ministries of Foreign
Affairs of Finland, the Belgian Cooperation, DFID and UNICEF further financially support
CMVIS.
Whereas Mines Advisory Group (MAG) first established CMVIS in 1994, it has been under the
full responsibility of CRC and HIB since September of 1995. Since its inception, CMVIS has
aimed to contribute to the protection of mine and UXO affected communities, the prevention of
mine and UXO incidents 7 and the provision of support to mine-UXO casualties.
7

This report will use the term ‘incident’ to describe the event in which a landmine/UXO explodes unexpectedly.
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The specific objectives of CMVIS are:
- To maintain and coordinate a sustainable information-gathering and referral network of
mine/UXO casualties in Cambodia
- To analyze and disseminate mine/UXO casualty information nationally and
internationally
- To support the capacity and development of the Cambodian Red Cross in undertaking the
activity independently from HI-B
The primary outputs of the project are:
- The provision of assistance to the planning cycles of all programs concerned with mine
action and mine victim assistance
- The provision of advocacy for mine-affected communities and mine victims as well as
support to survivors of mine/UXO incidents through the dissemination of information on
the location and condition of survivors to victim assistance agencies.
The overall goal of CMVIS is to support a reduction in mine/UXO casualties in Cambodia and,
ultimately, the cessation of mine/UXO related impact on most affected communities.

3. PROJECT SETTING
Cambodia is a country of approximately 13.5 million people (population projection for 2004,
Ministry of Planning, p.8 CMVIS annual report 2004). Administratively, the country is divided in
24 provinces and municipalities, which each are divided in districts, which are made up of
communes. A number of villages together form one commune.
Cambodia endured decades of conflict during the 20th century, which left the landscape scattered
with mines and UXO. Landmines and anti-tank mines are particularly present in the North West
of the country, whereas UXO are more predominant in the South East. People working the land
and foraging the forests for food were, for many years, the primary victims. Up until 2002, more
casualties took place a result of mine incidents. Since 2003, however, a greater number of
casualties occurred due to incident with UXO. This shift can be explained by the increase in price
of scrap metal, which has led to people searching for, collecting and intentionally dismantling of
UXO for their metal content. The following table provides a quick overview of the change in the
occurrence of casualties caused by mine versus UXO since the year 2000.
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Mine in %
53
52
44
47
38
41

UXO in %
47
47
56
53
62
59

# Incidents

541
540
542

# Casualty
832
828
841
772
898
865
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Whereas one mine incident generally leads to one casualty, one UXO incident can lead to many
casualties. This is reflected in the significantly higher number of casualties in 2004 than in 2003,
whilst the number of incidents is actually lower than in 2003.
Cambodia counts many governmental and non-governmental humanitarian mine action (HMA)
agencies, as well as a large number of organizations that provide mine/UXO victim assistance.
Overall coordination of mine action in Cambodia is the responsibility of the Cambodian Mine
Action Authority (CMAA). Provincial planning of demining agencies is the task of each
province's Provincial Mine Action Committee (PMAC). The provincial Mine Action Planning
Units (MAPUs) gather data on behalf of the PMAC.
The overall environment in which HMA takes place in Cambodia and the context within which
CMVIS works is not only one that is technical in nature, but very much social, geographic and
political as well. Social in that is people from the lowest socio-economic groupings that are most
affected; geographical in that certain areas are more affected than others, and political as those
areas (K5) most affected by mines border on Thailand, thereby turning the mine issue into an
issue of border security as well.
CMVIS plays an important role in HMA in Cambodia, as it collects and disseminates mine/UXO
casualty data, which is essential if those resources available are to be used effectively, whether
through better targeting or monitoring of the various components of HMA. In addition, the
project aims to support mine victims by acting as a liaison between the victims and those
agencies that can support through the provision of equipment, other resources and training, to
name only a few.

4. RATIONALE FOR EVALUATION
To maximize CMVIS's contribution to its stated objective and overall goal, the project has
received external input through a number of evaluations.
In 2000, UNICEF supported an evaluation that focused on an analysis of stated objectives of the
project and the system of data gathering employed. In 2003, HIB conducted an evaluation of the
database system, and in 2004 an end-user satisfaction study was conducted.
At this time, when CMVIS has been in operation for ten years, and the number of casualties
increased in 2004 and 2005 as compared to the average of proceeding years, HIB commissioned
an evaluation to assess the project for its consistency and effectiveness. The forthcoming
recommendations aim to increase the efficiency of the project's deployment and daily
management.

5. PURPOSE and OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION
The overall purpose of the evaluation as per the TO (11/10/05) is to: "…assess how much the
project is currently responding to the overall challenge to collect comprehensive and detailed
information on mine and UXO victims that can be reliably used by end users"
6

The objectives of the evaluation as stated in the TOR(11/10/05) can be found on the next page:
- To assess the humanitarian impact of the project on mine action practitioners' work in
terms of strategy formulation and priority deployment... This includes demining agencies,
HMA NGOs, CMAA, PMAC, MAPU, CBMRR...
-

To assess the CMVIS deployment scheme and its expected responsiveness towards
beneficiaries; propose a revised scheme of intervention if required making the best use of
CRC volunteer network

-

To analyze the consistency of the chain of operations from staff/volunteer deployment to
final reporting and dissemination

-

To assess the CRC management capacity with the objective to ultimately work
independently from HI-B Technical Assistance; analyze existing internal management
tools, set conditions and draft plan for the transfer of responsibilities

-

To develop a benchmark outlining the minimum technical, managerial requirements and
best political ownership/support to export the model.

6. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES and RELATED QUESTIONS
In order of Hi-B priority, the objectives of the evaluation (TOR 11/10/05) and the key, as well as
possible sub-questions raised by each objective can be found below.
6.1 To analyze the consistency of the chain of operations from staff/volunteer deployment to
final reporting and dissemination
•

Key question:
What, if any, steps can be taken to improve the consistency, i.e. reliability, of data
collected, processed, reported and disseminated by CMVIS?

•

Sub-questions:
1. How reliable is the data collected by the Data Gathers (DG) on the same victims when
compared to the data obtained by the Field Supervisor?
2. What, if any, criteria for follow-up of mine victims have been developed to ensure
that data collected about the status of the injury is still reliable three months after
initial visit of DG?
3. What, if any, monitoring processes are in place to ensure CMVIS data is reliable?"
4. What are the possible stages in the data collection process where errors can occur and
what measures are in place to correct these?
5. Given the relatively low number of UXO incidents in the East of Cambodia, what
sources of information are available to CMVIS to ensure all casualties are recorded?
6. To what extent is CMVIS data complete when cross-referenced with data from, for
example, Prosthetic Rehabilitation Centers (PRC), Community-based Mine Risk
Reduction (CBMRR) project, Community-based UXO Risk Reduction (CBURR)

7

project, Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU), Jesuit Services Cambodia (JSC),
CARE Cambodia, Disability Action Council (DAC), and local authorities?

6.2 To assess the CMVIS management capacity with the objective to ultimately work
independently from HI-B Technical Assistance (TA) 8; analyze existing internal
management tools, set conditions and draft plan for the transfer of responsibilities
It should be noted that this objective was modified six weeks into the evaluation process.
Whereas the TOR originally asked for a road map leading to a partial or complete withdraw
of Technical Assistance including timeframe and thus implied that a hand-over of the project
from HI-B to CRC was pending, this changed with the departure of, and subsequent change
in project support from, the Mine and Injury Prevention Coordinator to HI-B Country
Director.
Following the departure of the former at the end of January 2006, the latter adjusted HI-B’s
vision. This led to a change in the TOR six weeks into the evaluation, from one that was
exploring initial feasibility of CRC taking over the project and CMVIS capacity to manage
the project without HI-B support to one that focused solely on assessing the ability of CMVIS
staff to work without external support from HI-B.
The original TOR asked for an investigation of CRC HQ's future intent to manage the
CMVIS project independently from HI-B in the long term. As this was already explored prior
to the change in the TOR, this will still be reported on in Part B of the evaluation.
The following key questions and corresponding sub-questions will be answered by the
evaluation.
•
-

•

Key questions:
What is CMVIS staff's current internal non-technical (knowledge/skills, i.e. management
tools) and technical (knowledge/skills related to data base, monitoring and training)
capacity to manage the CMVIS project without HI-B TAs?
What are the minimal conditions that need to be in place for the CRC CMVIS staff to
competently run the CMVIS project independent from HI-B TA?
What time frame is required for these conditions to be met and for responsibilities to be
transferred?
Sub-questions:
1. What is CMVIS staff internal technical and non-technical capacity?
2. What tasks are currently conducted by the two TAs?
3. For which of the tasks that are currently conducted by the TAs does CMVIS already
have the capacity, time and resources in-house?
4. How capable would CMVIS be today to manage the project independently from HIB?

8

The two HI-B Technical Advisors work in the role of Injury Surveillance Project Advisor and Training and
Monitoring Officer. In this report, they will either be referred to as TAs when discussed in duo, or as TA-ISPA and
TA-TMO when specific mention is made of their specific role in the project.
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5. What is minimally required in terms of technical and non-technical capacity for
CMVIS to be independent from HI-B?
6. In keeping with the third objective of CMVIS to support the capacity and
development of the Cambodian Red Cross, what steps has HI-B already taken to
support the CRC to independently manage the project?
7. What other steps need to be taken by HI-B to strengthen CMVIS staff management
(non-technical) and technical capacity (i.e. database, monitoring and training), as well
as resources if CRC CMVIS staff is to manage the project as independently as
possible?

6.3 To assess the CMVIS deployment scheme and it's expected responsiveness towards
beneficiaries (i.e. mine/UXO victims and their families); propose a revised scheme of
intervention if required making the best use of CRC volunteer network
•
•

Key questions:
To what degree is CMVIS current deployment scheme of field staff and volunteers
responsive to the needs of beneficiaries?
What deployment scheme of CMVIS field staff and volunteers would best serve the needs
of beneficiaries?
Sub-questions:
1. Does the distribution (i.e. deployment scheme) of Data Gathers (DGs) and volunteers
reflect reporting needs in terms of the number and location of casualties?
2. What are the activities of Data Gathers (DGs) and volunteers and which of these
respond to the needs of beneficiaries?
3. With which victim assistance agencies have CMVIS staff and volunteers established
partnerships?
4. When comparing which victim assistance agencies were contacted by DGs (as stated
in their monthly reports) with those agencies known to be active in the same district,
are there any victim assistance organizations with which CMVIS has not yet built a
relationship?
5. What feedback does CMVIS staff have regarding the CMVIS deployment scheme and
expected responsiveness towards beneficiaries?
6. Given current capacity (knowledge, attitudes and behavior) of, and resources (time,
money, equipment such as mobile telephone and motor bike) available to, field staff
and volunteers, what results related to victim advocacy and support could realistically
be expected?
7. What areas of CMVIS field staff and volunteers capacity need to be strengthened in
order to maximize CMVIS assistance to beneficiaries?
8. What, if any, is CMVIS' current strategy for following up on CMVIS generated
requests for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), mine clearance, mine marking and
mine risk education (MRE)?
9. What, if any, monitoring systems (i.e. criteria for follow up, quantitative and
qualitative approach to indicator development) are in place to ensure CMVIS reaches
the intended output of providing advocacy for and support to mine-affected
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communities and mine victims?" (In other words: To what extent are the results of
CMVIS activities related to mine/UXO victim support measured and used to modify
CMVIS response to beneficiaries or used to initiate new activities?)

6.4 To assess the humanitarian impact of the project on mine action practitioners' work in
terms of strategy formulation and priority deployment... This includes demining
agencies, HMA NGOs, CMAA, PMAC, MAPU, CBMRR …
•

Key question:
"To what degree does CMVIS currently meet the information needs of end users as it
relates to their ability to formulate strategy and decide on priority deployment?"

•

Sub-questions:
1. What are the opinions of end users about the reliability of CMVIS data?
2. How important is the exact location of the mine incident to end-users? (Data Gathers
are often not able to get the exact location of the mine incident due to safety issues)
3. In the opinion of end users, what are current strengths, weaknesses of the information
provided by CMVIS and how do they think better cooperation can be achieved?
4. How are areas for improvement prioritized by the various agencies?
5. Has CMVIS maximized its possible humanitarian impact on mine action practitioners'
work given its current activities?
6. Could CMVIS conduct other activities that would increase its humanitarian impact on
mine action practitioners' work? (For example, could CMVIS provide a meta-analysis
of the data similar to the Cambodia Road Traffic Accident and Victim Information
System (RTAVIS), thereby acting as monitoring tool for HMA in Cambodia while
also making it more accountable to CMVIS' overall goal of contributing to a reduction
in the number of mine/UXO casualties?)

The following objective was part of the original TOR. Upon review of the evaluation framework,
it was decided that objective 6.1 – 6.4 take priority. Due to time constraints it was decided to
eliminate this last objective from the TOR. For the sake of being complete, it is included in this
evaluation framework.

6.5 To develop a benchmark outlining the minimum technical, managerial requirements
and best political ownership/support to export the model
•
-

Key question:
What are the minimum technical and managerial requirements and what would be the best
possible political/support situation if a data base similar to CMVIS were to be developed
in other mine/UXO affected countries?

•
-

Sub-questions:
What are the current technical and managerial conditions that allow CMVIS to function?
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-

-

-

In the opinion of staff at CMVIS, CRC, HMA, HIB and possibly other NGOs; what are
the minimum technical and managerial requirements if CMVIS were to be successful in
other mine/UXO-affected countries?
In the opinion of staff at CMVIS, CRC, HMA, HIB and possibly other NGOs; what is the
best political ownership/support situation if a data base similar to CMVIS were to be
successful in other mine/UXO-affected countries?
Does IMSMA provide any valuable information regarding benchmark development for
mine/UXO victim data base development?
What, if any, best practices are known for establishing a data collection system like
CMVIS?

7. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK and METHODOLOGY
This conceptual framework guiding this evaluation will be results-oriented, rather than activity
oriented. This means that the evaluation will focus on how CMVIS is achieving results as related
to stated objective of the project, rather than focus on the activities of the project alone. As may
be evident from the questions posed above, this evaluation will analyze the project's
accountability to results, rather than to activities.
Activities are seen as a means to an end by the evaluator, therefore it is important to assess
whether the right activities are conducted given the stated objectives, and if so whether these
activities are reaching the intended result. Alternatively, it is important to investigate if the
project is engaged in activities that lead to results that are not captured by one of the objectives. If
so, it may be necessary to adjust the project's stated objectives. Results (changes that are achieved
as a result of the project) will be considered along the continuum of time, i.e., at the shorter-term
output level, but also at the intermediate (outcome) and long-term (impact) level. In other words,
which quantitative and qualitative results, and when, can be expected along the time continuum
given the resource inputs of the project?
The following methods will be used to gather the understanding necessary to evaluate the project:
- Document review and cross-referencing of data, both internally as externally
- Qualitative evaluation tools such as formal and semi-formal and formal interviews,
knowledge/attitude and practice survey, job shadowing, and field visits
- Participatory tools will be used where possible

8. EXPECTED OUTPUTS
As per the TOR (11/10/05), the following outputs are expected:
- The delivery of a draft evaluation report with the main findings, analyses and practical
recommendations prepared for review by HI-B and CRC.
- A final evaluation report presenting the methodologies, the findings, and the recommendations
of the evaluator. This will include an analysis of progress made since previous evaluation studies
11

(UNICEF Sept 2002 and HI-B June 2004). This will also contain illustrations of the project
activities. The report should contain an executive summary outlining the main findings and
recommendations, which can later be translated into Khmer and distributed to the major
stakeholders in the field.
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PART B – Evaluation Results

This document reports on the results of the evaluation in four different sections, each one of
which presents the findings and recommendations in response to one objective. Before presenting
findings and recommendations, each section is introduced by describing the current situation of
the project in relation to the specific objective.

1. Current Situation, Main Findings and Recommendations
1.1

CONSISTENCY OF CHAIN OF OPERATIONS

Evaluation Objective
To analyze the consistency of the chain of operations from staff/volunteer deployment to final
reporting and dissemination
Key question:
What, if any, steps can be taken to improve the consistency, i.e. reliability, of data collected,
processed, reported and disseminated by CMVIS?

1.1.1

Current Situation

The CMVIS chain of operations is well-thought out and operates effectively. This chain is
formed by fifteen full time and three part time data gathers (DGs), who are hired from amongst
CRC staff and selected for their knowledge of, and connections in, a specific geographic area.
They report to the provincial CRC Director on a weekly basis and have been employed by the
project since 1999. For casualty reporting in those areas with fewer incidents, CMVIS relies on
six main volunteers and approximately 500 Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) volunteers throughout
all of the 24 provinces/municipalities of Cambodia. The project also relies on another 345
CMVIS volunteers. In addition, DGs may have what is called ‘friend volunteers’ in areas where
CRC and CMVIS volunteers are scarce. Together, they are the eyes and ears of the CMVIS
project. The CRC and CMVIS volunteers do not complete the CMVIS casualty information form
(see Appendix A), but report new casualties to one of the DGs or main volunteers. Main
volunteers receive USD$5 for each mine/UXO casualty reported, as well as a small annual fee to
compensate for any expenses related to their duties.
Each DG and main volunteer is responsible for reporting each and every mine/UXO casualty in
the defined geographical area for which they are responsible. The deployment of the DGs and
main volunteers is reviewed once a year and was last changed in July of 2005. Whereas the
project currently operates with 15 full time staff, it operated with 18 full time staff prior to July
2005. Three full time staff were withdraws, one each from Siem Reap, Pursat and Battambang
province.
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According to the 2005-2006 CMVIS proposal to the Government of Finland 9, the deployment
scheme (see Appendix B for a map of Cambodia and location of DGs and main volunteers). is
decided upon by “the degree of mine/UXO contamination at a commune, district and provincial
level, as reported by MAG, CMAC and Geospatial International. Additionally, the results of HIB/CRC national survey of mine victims has enabled the division of Cambodia into operationally
high and low incident villages, districts, communes and provinces, according to the number of
casualties recorded by the survey. Finally, an analysis of the history of conflict in Cambodia, and
areas known to have experienced large amounts of conflict, will influence the choice of sites.”
The distance to be traveled by DG and main volunteer, as well as ease of access to the area are
also points of consideration.
When DGs and main volunteers receive news of a mine/UXO incident, they travel to meet the
victim and/or their family. On average, the number of days between the incident and the time the
DGs collect their casualty information is six days 10. A wide variety of sources inform DGs about
new casualties. These include CRC and CMVIS volunteers, Commune and Village Chiefs,
police, mine action operators, to staff at the provincial CRC offices and health centers (for a list
of persons/agencies with whom each DG had contact in 2005, see Appendix C).
By the time the news of a new casualty reaches the DGs, it has often been passed from person to
person, not infrequently via radio communication if the casualty is seriously injured, or via a
written note if the injury is not considered serious. Below are some examples of various people in
the chain of information sources that leads to the DGs and main volunteers being informed of a
new casualty.
DG BTM – Mann Sa Im – Data of incident January 12th 2006
Time to report: 15 days
Local people

police in village

Commune police

District office

DG

DG Kampong Speu – Sous Bun Soeurn – Data of incident January 17th 2006
Time to report: 2 days
Director of school

Police

DG

DG Pursat – TYim Kimsean - Data of incident January 2nd 2006
Time to report: 2 days
Soldier in the group of victims
head quarters of border police

Commune police
Contact by radio communication to
Provincial police
DG

Though DGs have recently begun to work with a monthly work plan that outlines the villages to
be checked for new casualties and follow up meetings with ‘old’ casualties, the plan is flexible
9

CMVIS project proposal 2005-2006 (p. 14) – submitted by HI-B for the consideration of the Government of
Finland.
10
Information obtained from DGs during their monthly visits to DMO
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and allows for an immediate response to new incidents. DGs and main volunteers aim to
interview the actual victim. If this is not possible, either because the person has died or is too
injured, the person closest to the victim will be interviewed. Global Positioning System (GPS) 11
coordinates of the site of the incident are taken. If it is not safe to enter the area, GPS coordinates
of the point closest to the incident site, estimated distance to the site of the accident and compass
reading are noted. If the casualty occurred in a new village that has yet to be assigned a village
code by the Department of Geography (DoG), the DG will take the nearest village code and alert
the Phnom Penh Data Management Office (DMO) with a yellow post-it note on the casualty
report form. This is done consistently by all DGs. A non-designated staff in the DMO will go to
the DoG to obtain the new code.
All forms completed by DGs will be brought to the DMO and submitted to the field supervisors
once a month by thirteen of the eighteen DGs, or sent to PP by taxi by the main volunteer. The
phone number of the taxi driver is passed by the main volunteer to the DMO office, which will
pay the fare upon receipt of the form. The field supervisors will check each form for missing data
and complete where possible. If more information is required, the DGs will be asked to obtain it.
DGs will generally visit each casualty more than once; although each does so as his/her own
discretion as no clear guidelines for when to do so currently exist.
Next, data on the 210 fields contained in the casualty report form is entered into the ACCESS
data base by the two field supervisors. Once the data has been inputted into ACCESS, the data
base is be queried for ad-hoc reports, as well as for the monthly and annual reports (for a flow
chart of data collection operations, see Appendix D), which are produced using Microsoft Excel
and Arc View GIS software. The monthly and annual reports are sent to end-users in electronic
and paper format. The total number of end-users currently is 886 and comprises a diverse group,
ranging from humanitarian mine action agencies, victim assistance agencies, to embassies and
donors.
As CMVIS is a central data base for mine/UXO casualty and incident data, accuracy of this data
is paramount if the information it yields is to be reliable. To ensure accuracy, CMVIS aspires to
use a consistent data collection, reporting and dissemination process. To ensure consistency,
CMVIS is in the process of completing a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) manual. The SOP
aims to guide the planning, implementation and management of the CMVIS project. It is
anticipated that the implementation of the SOP will enhance consistency of the process and, as a
result, increase accuracy of the data. The CMVIS SOP will be available in both Khmer and
English.
To ensure reliability of the data collected, DGs cross reference their data on an ad-hoc basis with
that of the Community-based Mine Risk Reduction project (CMAC) and occasionally with that
of the MAPUs, ICRC, Veterans International (VI) and Provincial Rehabilitation Centre (PRC)
and the Capacity Building of People with Disabilities in the Community (CABDIC) project. Staff
also checks written media for any incidents that may have gone unnoticed, although, like cross
checking data with various agencies, this has not been done in a systematic manner. CMVIS is

11

CMVIS has been using GPS coordinates since 2000, at which time they had ten in use. Since 2003, all DGs (18 in
total) have been equipped with GPS. Main volunteers and CRC volunteers do not have GPS.
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currently in the process of formalizing information exchange with MAPU, PRC, ICRC, and VI,
which may lead to more systematic cross-checking practices.
To ensure reliability of the data published in the annual report, one mechanism is in place. Field
supervisors and the Training and Monitoring Officer (TMO)/TA conduct a high number of spot
(i.e. double) checks of casualties during the first three months of the year. Criteria for deciding
which reports to spot check are as followed:
 Seriously injured
 Activity at time of accident handling mine/UXO, burning (not with mine/UXO) and/or
military activity
 Casualty did not attend mine awareness training
 No incident location GPS information
It should be noted that the above information is not readily available. Most of the staff did not
know these criteria exist and it took several times with several people to get a better
understanding how field supervisor decide on which form to spot check, and which not. Having
joined two field trips for the purpose of spot checking, it is clear that staff takes the task of double
check information seriously and explore every possible nook and cranny for mine/UXO
casualties that may have gone unnoticed by DGs and main volunteers. Examples of questions
asked in relation to this are: ‘any scrap metal traders in this area?’, or ‘do you know any people
that fish with explosives?’ Informants interviewed ranged from villagers, to village chief, health
centre director to police and volunteers.
Up until now, clear direction for casualty follow up by the DGs has been lacking. If DGs do
return to casualties sometimes after their visit, they may find the situation has changed. This
frequently occurs, as victims may have lost more of a limb due to complications, or received
victim assistance services some time after they were first injured. Any changes to the data
collected originally will be reported by the DGs to the DMO on their next visit to the CMVIS
office in PP.
The data contained in the CMVIS data base is backed up according to a rigorous schedule. This
ensures that the total of 60.000 entries is secure. Once a year, CMVIS staff queries the ACCESS
data base for duplicate reports. If duplicates are found, they will be investigated and removed if
found to report twice on one and the same incident.

1.1.2 Main Findings
Evidence of consistency of the chain of CMVIS operations would be the delivery of reliable,
accurate, useful data. Errors can happen at the following stages in this process:
- Data collection: are all casualties being reported and is the information collected accurate and
reliable?
- Submission of data: are all reports collected being submitted?
- Data entry: is the data entered correctly?
- Data analysis: is the data analyzed and reported correctly?
- Data dissemination: are the reports being disseminated to the right end-users?
16

- Data use: is the information disseminated considered valuable by end users?
Various checks were made to verify the reliability of the data collected, entered and analyzed,
and disseminated. Whether CMVIS delivers useful data is reported on in section 1.4.
Before proceeding to present the findings, it should be noted that the DGs, field supervisors and
TMO TA could not be more diligent in their field work. The challenges inherent in ensuring data
is correct are not easy to appreciate. People tend to relocate and vice versa, ‘old’ mine/UXO
victims move into the area and access to remote areas, both of which present as big challenges to
the spot checking process. During two field trips, the evaluator never ceased to be amazed at the
due diligence with which staff follows up with casualties, even if this meant driving to three
different locations. Equally, staff goes to great lengths to get accurate GPS location information
on UXO. Up to two times, we walked for kilometers to visit and record the accurate location of
an UXO.

1.1.2.1 Collection of data

 Review CMVIS field staff deployment scheme
CMVIS currently only considers predominantly historical data in deciding where to deploy staff
(see section 1.1.1). Appendix E outlines coverage area of each DG, the district and number of
commune and villages for which they are responsible, as well as the number of mine/UXO
casualties for 2005. As discussed in section 1.1.1, the deployment was last changed in June 2005
when the project reduced its staff in Siem Reap, Pursat and Battambang. The reasons for this
were stabilization in the number of casualties and improved road access. This reduction is fitting
giving casualty data for those three provinces. Given 2005 casualty data, coverage area and
access issues, the DGs seem to be properly deployed.
 Capacity of CRC and CMVIS volunteers
Contact between DG and CRC and CMVIS volunteers is regular in that they provide information
about the occurrence of incidents to the DGs. A number of the DGs 12 commented that more
training of volunteers is needed to ensure that the cooperation between volunteers and the DG is
optimal. A review of CMVIS volunteer training (see Appendix F) reveals that all volunteers
attended training once in the past five years, with 33 receiving training in 2005. The 33
volunteers were trained in Pursat and Siem Reap, where three DGs were formally deployed.
 Cross-reference data with CBMRR and MAPUs
CBMRR and the MAPUs were asked to provide casualty data for the purpose of crossreferencing data collected by the DGs. Neither sources claim that the data they collect is accurate
and reliable. On cross-referencing, it was found that there was no discrepancy between the data
collected by CMVIS and that collected by CBMRR during the two months of September and
October of 2005, although the latter’s data was presented in disorderly manner. Whereas the
CBMRR raw data can (with some minor changes in the way it is collected and presented) be used
as a guide to ensure that CMVIS data collection is complete (rather than accurate), the MAPU
raw data cannot serve this purpose. An explanation of why follows below.
12

Information obtained from DGs during conduct of knowledge – attitude and practice (KAP) survey (see part B
section 1.3.1)
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MAPU Australian Volunteers International Technical Advisors (AVI TA) conducted a
comparison of accident numbers for large Level One Survey polygons which did have CMVIS
incident locations recorded within them. The results were fairly inconclusive, in other words,
there was a poor correlation between the two. According to MAPU/AVI 13, “…this could be due
to a number of reasons:
 [CMVIS] accident locations are inaccurate so do not fall within suspect area or
investigated minefield (this could be due also to mistakes in interpreting the raw data with
compass & distance etc)
 [CMVIS] accidents recorded at village not accident location, and so actual location are
not recorded within polygon
 Village informants do not really know accurate location or dates of accidents in relation to
the area under investigation, and so provide MAPU with poor accident number
information
 MAPU have not recorded the accident numbers in the form (I have checked and this is
rare) or not entered into database (true of some of the latter mine field IDs which are
added after investigations to the work plan)
 We are only comparing two years of data, which may provide a part of the picture in
terms of clearance priority”
The poor correlation is likely due to a combination of the first three points. “It therefore
highlights the weakness in relying on local village informant’s memory for accident information,
and also the importance of the need for accurate location information by CMVIS to be able to
make this useful comparison for planning prioritization purposes. This low ‘hit rate’ of CMVIS
accident locations against planned clearance reduces the confidence in CMVIS data, and its use
in the planning process. But to only rely on village informant information is proven here to be
equally potentially flawed. Possibly CMVIS data can therefore only provide a guide or indicator
to approximate areas of problems, and should not be used at this large scale village level.”
As the above analysis shows, the raw MAPU – CMVIS data comparison does thus not provide
insight as to whether the CMVIS data is complete. This does not mean there is no value in crossreferencing data between MAPU and CMVIS; it simply means in needs to be done in another
way than presented above. Please see section 1.1.3.1 for recommendations related to this point.
 Comparison of data in casualty report from DG with that of field supervisor on spot check
A comparison was made between data collected on a number of categories in the casualty report
by DGs on 2005 casualties and those collected by field supervisors on their spot check field trips
during the first four months of 2005 (see table 1 below). The categories compared were selected
as priority areas of information by MAPUs, HALO, MAG, JMAS and UNICEF.
For the year 2005, the total number of casualties was 865, of which a total of 139 have been spot
checked to date. This represents 16% of total casualty reports. This number constitutes a reliable
sample size which allows for generalizing the findings of this comparison to all the data collected
during 2005. The following table outlines reliability rating, expressed in % of those data fields in
the casualty report form.
13

Email communication Andy Kervell, March 13 2006 (please note use of the term ‘accident’ refers to same as the
term ‘incident used in this report)
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Reliability Rating of Data in Casualty Report 2004
Category of Data

Reliability Rating (%)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

98.6%
100%
88.9%
81.9%
81.9%
100%
97.2%
100%
97.2%
84.7%
93.1%
97.2%
91.7%
81.9%
79.2%
86.1%
95.8%
63.9%
100%
100%
100%
65.3%
88.9%
100%
100%

Name village, commune, district, province of site of accident
Phum code
Current Address
Type of device
Accident exact X & Y coordinate
Date of accident
Age of victim
Gender of victim
Occupation of victim
Accident area description
Site marked as dangerous
Previous mine clearance
How often did victim go to the area
Did the victim know there was a mine/UXO at the site of accident?
If they knew there was a mine/UXO, why did they go there?
Victim attend mine awareness
Was the child victim attending school?
Has the victim received any disability services
Victim killed or injured?
If victim died, how long after accident?
Where did the casualty die?
Type of injury
Activity during accident
Other killed or injured
Animals killed or injured

The two categories that show the lowest rating are ‘victim received disability services’ (63.9%)
and ‘type of injury’ (65.3%). This confirms the fact that the status of these two categories
frequently changes after some time has passed; a below knee amputation may become an above
knee one, and a casualty who at first did not receive any services will have received them some
time after the initial injury. The average reliability of the data contained in these 25 categories is
90.9%


Criteria for follow-up visits of casualties by DGs and for field visit by Field Supervisor and
TMO TA
The low reliability rate of the categories ‘victim received disability services’ and ‘type of injury’
confirms the need for setting criteria for follow-up by DGs of particularly those most seriously
injured if the CMVIS data on particularly these two categories is to be reliable.
Criteria for determining which casualties should be visited more than once do currently not exist
and are decided upon by each individual DG and main volunteer. It appears that criteria for spot
checking do exist, but each Field Supervisor applies his own set and the program manager
himself is not even aware they exist. It will be important to clarify these criteria in the SOP and to
develop them for DG follow up of casualties as well. These should also be included in the SOP.
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1.1.2.2 Submission of data

 Tracking casualties from media to casualty report
During the time of the external evaluation, three incidents with a total of eight casualties reported
in the newspaper were tracked to assess if they were entered in the data base. The first two
incidents happened on January 31st and February 1st (The Cambodian Daily, February 2nd 2006).
It is unclear from the article which one of the incidents happened on the 31st and which one on
the 1st. The article read as followed:

One teenager was killed and two others critically injured in two land mine blasts in Battambang
province on Sunday and Monday, officials said. Seng Bros, 18, died instantly and a relative,
Nhor Chum, 17, was critically injured when a mine detonated as they cleared farmland in
Kamrieng district’s Trang commune. The land had been used for sesame and corn farming for
years without incident, said deputy district police chief Nol Sok. In Sampouv Loun district, Phat
Vuthy, 19, a high school student, was digging behind his house in Tasda commune when he
accidentally triggered a frog mine, which ejected and blew his left leg off above the knee, Sampov
Loun deputy district police chief Keang Vuthy said (p. 12).
The third incident occurred on the weekend of January 28th 2006 (The Cambodian Daily,
February 3rd 2006). The article reads as followed:

Five members of a family were injured in Svay Rieng province over the weekend when a B-40
shell exploded, officials said Thursday. Three brothers and their nephew found the shell in Prey
Chlak commune while swimming in a pond on Saturday, then took it home to their mother who
did not recognize what it was, said Prak Cham, provincial police chief. After that they cleaned it
and started playing around, rolling it, he said. The five injured area all being treated at the
provincial hospital, said hospital nurse In Sarin, adding that it has been possible to remove the
shrapnel from some of the victims, while others have wounds too deep to do so (p. 16).

Casualty reports were submitted for all eight of these casualties. This exercise was only a random
check and therefore does not provide insight into the overall quality of submission of data. The
outcome, however, can be considered a positive indicator of complete data submission.

1.1.2.3 Entry of data

 Random sample comparison
A random sample of ten casualty data collection forms were checked against the data entered into
the system. With the exception of one data field, the data entered into the computer from these
ten forms was the same as that on the forms. This bodes positively for the accurate transcription
of data in the form to the data base.
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1.1.2.4 Analysis of data

 Review of monthly and annual reports
A number of monthly and annual reports were reviewed and two errors were noticed in the 2004
Annual report: 1) the overview of country data per province on page 5 adds up to 86.8% rather
than 100%. Staff apparently calculates this table manually and acknowledged the miscalculation,
and 2) numbering in the casualty report form on page 9 of the same annual report is not
consistent with that of provincial data reports. For example, whereas the category on ‘Where did
the accident take place’ is numbered 6.1 in the casualty report form, yet the data on this category
is numbered 3 on the provincial data pages. When brought to the attention of staff, they
acknowledged the numbering in the provincial data pages was off.
The ACCESS data base automatically calculates the various categories of information provided
in the monthly CMVIS report. Analysis as such is not done by staff, but rather the information is
provided by the data base system upon standardized monthly query. Tables in both the annual
and monthly reports, however, often add up to either a bit less or more than 100%. The Program
Manager explained that this is due to the fact that percentages on the individual items in a table
are rounded up or down.
Although CMVIS states in its general objectives that it analyzes the data, its ‘analytical’ work is
limited to descriptions of the statistics. Further analysis would require interpreting the data,
capacity for which is lacking amongst current staff.

1.1.2.5 Dissemination of data

 System for maintaining updated end-user list
CMVIS distributes monthly and annual reports by email, hand and postal delivery. The only
method for keeping the email list up to date is the deletion of those email addresses that are
rejected three times. There is no system in place that confirms that electronic end-users actually
want to continue to receive the information. As for those reports that are hand delivered,
confirmation of the desire for continued information is received upon delivery. There is no
system in place for reports to confirm that reports mailed out are either received or still desired.
In addition and perhaps, more importantly, the project currently lacks a means by which to ensure
that all agencies and organizations that could use the data are actually receiving it. CMVIS is
recommended to hold a meeting with senior level management of CRC and HI-B to review the
current end-user list and determine whether other agencies/organization/authorities, etc. not yet
included on the end-user list should be informed of CMVIS services. It is advised to conduct
such a review on an annual basis.
 Level of end-user satisfaction
For information on this item, please check section 1.4.
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1.1.3 Recommendations
Based on the main findings of the evaluation, the following recommendations are made with
regards to improving the CMVIS chain of operations.
1.1.3.1 Collection of data

 Consider indicators other than casualty data in deploying and directing field staff
CMVIS currently deploys field staff based on historical casualty data and knowledge of areas
with large amounts of armed conflict, i.e. retro-actively. This could be misleading as deploying
few staff in lower casualties areas may actually lead to casualties going unreported. However,
based on the findings of this evaluation, CMVIS staff is thorough in their work to report all
casualties through DGs high level of commitment to the project, a diverse network of informants
and extensive travel.
CMVIS may, however, also want to consider those factors that contribute to an increase in the
number of casualties in a given area, such as the speed and type of development (new roads are
known to draw in new people) in a given area. This would enable CMVIS to decide upon
deployment not only reactively, but pro-actively as well. Speed and type of development will
particularly influence those people most vulnerable. Predisposition to mine/UXO incidents is
directly related to people’s vulnerability and thus the more vulnerable a person, the more s/he is
at risk of being involved in a mine/UXO incident. Vulnerability to mine/UXO risk is directly
related to poverty. Indices of poverty are numerous. Within the Cambodian mine/UXO risk
context, two stand out, namely population movement and access to resources. Infrastructure
development projects and mine clearance for development have in the past led to an increase in
casualties. Casualties follow development, or said differently, development precedes casualties.
One example is that shared by Ian Thomas 14, CMAA technical advisor. One of the mine
operators apparently finished clearing west of Pailin city towards the border through Steung Kach
and Bar Yakha communes in early 2005. This reportedly resulted in eleven casualties as people
used the new road to settle (and cut) previously inaccessible forest. CMVIS is recommended to
stay abreast of such development projects by requesting provincial development plans where
available. This would enable them to stay alert to the eventuality of an increase in casualties in
specific areas. If unable to consider such criteria when deciding where to deploy DGs and
volunteers, CMVIS staff at the DMO office could inform DGs of any planned development that
is expected to lead to an increase in casualties.
 Organize annual refresher course for all CRC and CMVIS volunteers
CMVIS relies on having a reliable volunteer network. Without this, CMVIS would not be the
well-respected source of casualty information it is today. As mentioned by the UNICEF External
Evaluation in 2000 15, “volunteers and communication networks are not established without
organization, communication and some degree of incentive or motivation.” In order to be sure
that volunteers are engaged and reporting casualties, it is recommended to provide a refresher
course once per year. This would not only ensure volunteers are engaged, but perhaps more

14

15

Interview CMAA TA – February 8th 2006
UNICEF External Evaluation of Supported Mine Action Projects June/July 2000, p. 43
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importantly, show volunteers appreciation for their work. The role of appreciation for volunteers
should not be underestimated.
This training would be best designed and delivered by the DGs with support from the field
supervisor and TMO TA. In those areas where there DGs are not employed, this training should
be delivered by the field supervisors and/or TMO TA. Extra funding will have to be made
available.
 Diversify and structure sources for cross-checking data
CMVIS can only ascertain that its data is complete by cross-referencing the number of casualties
reported with those known to other sources. Such sources are currently limited to the CBMRR
project which works in the five most mine/UXO affected provinces, and hospital and VA
agencies in some of the provinces. Cross-referencing is done in an unstructured and ad hoc way.
The reliability of the CMVIS data would be much enhanced if more sources were accessed in a
more systematic way. The Mine Awareness Officer in charge of the CBMRR project at CMAC
HQ receives monthly reports from the field that report on the number and name of casualties in
CBMRR villages, which currently totals 130 in five provinces in the NW of the country.
Although this data is not presented in organized form, CMVIS is recommended to meet with
CBMRR management to request this and to formalize sharing data on a monthly basis.
The MAPUs, which currently work in five provinces as well, do not collect as detailed
information as the CBMRR project, but their field staff has knowledge of casualties that could
help DGs to ensure they have reported on all casualties.
From conversations with the MAPU/AVI, MAPU would encourage closer cooperation with
CMVIS. CMVIS is advised to meet with MAPU leadership and AVI to explain what type of
information it requires and, if both parties agree, an agreement formalized. AVI suggested
MAPU staff would need some training from the DGs to understand what sort of questions they
should ask and to decide how often they should meet. Better incident data would not only benefit
the work of CMVIS, but also that of the MAPUs.
A source that has until now remained untapped is the SEILA socio-economic inventory.
Although SEILA currently does not collect any casualty data, it does gather information on a
wide number of categories. SEILA could be invited to add one category on the presence and
number of mine/UXO casualties. Another potential source may be the CENSUS, which in the
recent past included a question as to whether there are any mine/UXO casualties in the
household. Unfortunately, the CENSUS did not ask how many casualties there were. Requesting
the CENSUS to also collect information on the number of casualties would make the CENSUS
data into a valuable source for CMVIS. A last source is the CMAC/Japanese Mine Action
Service (JMAS) Community-based UXO Risk Reduction (CBURR) project. CMAC’s EOD
coordinator 16 advised that although the project is currently not collecting any UXO casualty
information, it is keen to enter into partnership with CMVIS. Some training of CBURR staff
would be required according to the EOD Coordinator. Other sources for cross-referencing are
MAG’s village assessment data, which it would gladly share with CMVIS 17., the PRCs and
16
17

Interview CMAC EOD Coordinator, March 3rd, 2006.
Interview MAG Country Program Manager, March 7th 2006.
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CABDIC. The latter two are already being consulted for the purpose of cross checking, although
this has yet to be done on a regular basis.
Systematizing and formalizing cross checking of data would equally provide both CMVIS and
the partner agency with valuable information about all incidents and casualties in their district.
 Conduct annual analysis of all spot-checked forms
CMVIS could gain valuable knowledge about the overall reliability of data by comparing data
gathered by field supervisors against that collected by the DGs on an annual basis. The
comparison done as part of this evaluation could act as a baseline against which future annual
analysis and results could be measured.


Design standardized criteria for casualty follow up by DG and for spot checks by field
supervisor and TMO TA
The reliability of CMVIS data would be strengthened if criteria were designed that would
determine which casualties DG should meet with more than once, and which casualty report
forms should be spot checked. Naturally, one would suggest these criteria to lead to those
casualties that were severely injured to be followed up by DG or spot checked by field supervisor
and TMO for any changes in their status.

1.1.3.2 Analysis of data

 Conduct more thorough editing of monthly and annual reports
Simple errors can easily be avoided with more thorough editing. CMVIS is recommended to
ensure all tables, pie charts, diagrams and bar graphs add up to exactly 100% as this would
increase end-user confidence in the data.
1.1.3.3 Dissemination of data

 System for maintaining updated end-user list
The current system for ensuring that end-users either receive the information and want to
continue to receive it is in place for those end-users who receive the information through handdelivery, but is missing for those distributed by postal delivery.
CMVIS system of deleting email addresses that are rejected may work, but still does not ensure
that end-users reached by email actually want to continue to receive the information. This
challenge is inherent in one-way communication through email and is one that is faced not by
CMVIS alone, but indeed by many organizations who provide information on a regular basis to a
large distribution list. In order to ensure that those end-users that are reached either by email
desire the continued flow of information, CMVIS is advised to sent out a query email once per
year, requesting end-users who wish to continue to receive the information to confirm this by
sending a return email. This is time consuming for CMVIS and one may query the cost-benefit of
this. However, without knowing the number of people that actually use the CMVIS information,
CMVIS will be hard-pressed to convince donors of its ongoing relevance. The same could be
done for those end-users that receive CMVIS reports through the regular mailing system, but in
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the form of a written letter and a request for mailing back a slip in pre-posted envelopes that
indicates their ongoing interest.
As mentioned in the findings section, CMVIS currently does not have a means by which it
checks whether there are any agencies/organizations/authorities etc that could benefit from the
data but are not included on the end-user list. CMVIS is recommended to hold a meeting with
senior level management of CRC and HI-B to review the current end-user list and determine
whether the list is complete. If not, those potential end-users not yet included should be informed
of CMVIS’ services and queried for their interest in taking advantage of such. CMVIS is advised
to conduct such a review on an annual basis.
 Common and consistent core of data fields
The terms ‘incident’ and ‘accident’ are used interchangeably by the CMVIS project to describe
the event in which a landmine/UXO explodes unexpectedly. The annual report and casualty
report form use the term ‘accident’, whereas the monthly report uses ‘incident’ 18. This can lead to
misinterpretation of the data. This inconsistency is common not only to CMVIS but across the
mine action community, including those involved the collection of casualty data. The new
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS 19) attempt to clarify the use of these terms, but even
IMSMA has not fully adopted the use of the terms according to the standards.
“IMSMA 20 distinguishes between incident and accident by having two different sets of forms for
collecting information: one for use when there is an “accident” during a demining-related
operation and the other for use when a landmine or UXO explodes unexpectedly at times other
than during a demining-related activity.” CMVIS is recommended to select one and to use it
consistently.
Summary of Recommendations
Data Collection
1. Consider indicators other than casualty data in deploying and directing field staff
2. Organize annual refresher course for all CRC and CMVIS volunteers
3. Diversify and structure sources for cross-checking data
4. Conduct annual analysis of all spot-checked forms
5. Design standardized criteria for casualty follow up by DG and for spot checks by field
supervisor and TMO
Data Analysis
6. Conduct more thorough editing of monthly and annual reports
Data Dissemination
7. Develop a system that assists with maintaining updated end-user list
8. Develop common and consistent core of data fields
18

This report will consistently use the term ‘incident’ to describe the event of mine/UXO explosion
International Mine Action Standards 04.10 - Second Edition (2003). Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and
abbreviations.
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Wessel, T., Fiederlein, S., & Ferguson, F. (2001). James Madison University – Mine Action Information System:
Managing landmine casualty data: Designing and developing data structures and models to track and manage
landmine casualty data
19
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1.2

CMVIS CAPACITY

Evaluation Objective
To assess the CMVIS management capacity with the objective to ultimately work independently
from HI-B Technical Assistance (TA); analyze existing internal management tools, set conditions
and draft plan for the transfer of responsibilities.
Key questions:
- What is CMVIS staff's current internal non-technical (knowledge/skills, i.e. management tools)
and technical (knowledge/skills related to data base, monitoring and training) capacity to manage
the CMVIS project without HI-B TA?
- What are the minimal conditions that need to be in place for the CMVIS staff to competently
run the CMVIS project independent from HI-B TA?
- What time frame is required for these conditions to be met and for responsibilities to be
transferred?
As discussed in Part A, this section also explores CRC HQ’s intent for managing the CMVIS
project independently from HI-B in the future.

1.2.1

Current Situation

CMVIS has been managed by the CRC in partnership with HI-B and been operated since
September 1995. CRC HQ’s responsibility for the CMVIS project is management of human
resources (hiring of staff, provision of staff benefit and salary), logistics, donor reports and the
proper distribution of funds allocated to CMVIS that are provided by HI-B. Since September of
last year, CMVIS also receives funds directly from UNICEF for the purpose of a one year pilot
project that provides emergency house repairs in the two provinces of Preah Vihear and Otdar
Meanchey.
Since 1995, HI-B has been providing financial, technical and management support to the project;
financial in terms of proposal writing, budgeting, report writing, auditing, donor relations etc.;
technical and management in the form of two full-time technical advisors who provide assistance
with the data base, management, monitoring and training aspects of the project. Until recently,
HI-B’s Mine and Injury Prevention Coordinator provided support on a wide variety of projectrelated aspects. The HI-B Coordinator recently left his post and a new person is to be hired into
the position of Program Coordinator shortly, who will continue to provide support to the project.
HI-B has been lending support to the project in the form of two technical advisors: one an injury
surveillance project advisor (ISPA) since 1998, and one training and monitoring officer (TMO)
TA since 2001. Whereas the previous ISPA TA reportedly concerned himself mostly with the
data base aspect of the project, the current ISPA TA has widened his role to also include
management (logic framework, organizing of weekly meetings, etc.) and partnership support. The
ISPA TA has been with the project for year and half. The current TMO TA has been with the
project since September 2005. His role has also expanded when compared with that of the
previous TMO TA. The latter focused only on the quality of the data gathering aspect of DGs’
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work, whereas the current TMO TA is also monitoring other areas of their work, such as victim
assistance and proposing tools by which to plan their work, such as a monthly work plan. The
TMO TA travels to the districts approximately one to two weeks out of each month to assess the
various activities of the DGs and main volunteers.
The CMVIS project is currently carried by a total of 22 CRC full-time and three part-time CRC
staff, seven main volunteers and a network of more than 800 volunteers. Of the total of 25 staff,
five work in the Data Management Office (DMO) in PP: one program manager who has worked
with the project since its inception in 1996, two field supervisors and an operator, all three of
whom have been with the project for ten years, two drivers and one cleaner (see Appendix G) for
an organizational chart). The remaining 18 staff work as Data Gathers (DGs) in the provinces; 15
of whom full-time and three half-time.
In the past four months, the project has also been supported full-time by Ms. Ngim, who
volunteers her time and assists with a wide variety of data management related tasks. Her
contribution is significant. Up until March 2005, the project counted two data base operators;
now only one 21, and until September 2005, the CMVIS team also included one data base
supervisor. Since, this position has been vacant and the CRC has been in the process of hiring for
this position.
The current location of the CMVIS office is a space rented by CRC and funded by HI-B 22 and
UNICEF in a building across the street from the CRC office on road 180 in PP. During the period
of this evaluation, this location frequently suffered from power cuts23. Power outages during
office hours during these three months occurred for a total of 46 hours, thereby reducing office
productivity by more than 12.5% during the two months of the evaluation. Whereas the CRC HQ
office uses generators during times of outage, the CMVIS office was unable to use power off this
grid for fears of crashing the aged generators. Discussion between the CRC and CMVIS were
underway during the evaluation, which did not lead to CRC resolving the issue. Towards the end
of the evaluation, HI-B provided funds for the project to purchase a generator.

1.2.2 Main Findings
CMVIS is currently jointly managed and supported by HI-B and CRC. In the future, it is assumed
CMVIS will continue to work under the umbrella of an organization; however, it is unclear at this
pointing time as to whether this will continue to be the CRC or another agency. During the field
trip to Mondol Kiri, the local CRC Director was asked if he would still lend the support of his
volunteers to the project if it were to be moved to another organization. He confirmed that this
would not make a difference and that he would gladly continue the partnership with CMVIS.

21

According to the program manager, this operator worked on the Road Traffic Accident System, which operated
from the CMVIS office up until the middle of 2005. With RTVIS moving to the HI-B office, this position was no
longer needed and thus a replacement was not hired.
22
CRC apparently offered the CMVIS project space in its warehouse in Obek K’am some years ago, but HI-B
reportedly disinclined based on the fact that the warehouse had yet to be renovated and was too far away.
23
Power cuts are a frequent occurrence throughout the city as a result of the government’s work to increase the
capacity of the grid.
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During this evaluation, the CMVIS project was assessed for its current technical and nontechnical capacity to manage the project without the support of HI-B. It was not within the scope
of this evaluation to analyze CMVIS capacity to manage its financial matters independently from
HI-B. This will be evaluated in the future through an external audit. In essence then, this
evaluation will only draw part of the picture necessary to decide whether CMVIS can be
managed independently from HI-B.
The question whether CMVIS can be managed independently from HI-B can only be fully
answered if CMVIS technical and non-technical capacity and that of the other supporting agency,
the CRC, is properly understood. This evaluation did not assess CRC HQ capacity to manage
CMVIS without HI-B’s support, but did explore CRC HQ intent for to independently managing
the project in the future.

1.2.2.1 CRC HQ intent for future involvement with CMVIS

For over ten years, HI-B and CRC have been partners in supporting the CMVIS project. Yet,
according to HI-B, despite their efforts to invite greater input of CRC HQ into the management
of CMVIS, the latter’s involvement has remained low over the years.
A recent staff change at CRC saw the appointment of a new acting Director of Planning. Since
cooperation with the previous Director had been challenging, this change was welcome. A
meeting was held between HI-B Mine and Injury Prevention Coordinator, the CMVIS program
manager, HI-B TAs and the evaluator on January 30th 2006 to explore CRC's intent in terms of
managing the CMVIS project independently from HI-B in the future. Mr. Provoost first
introduced this as the purpose of meeting, after which the acting Director of Planning. shared his
views for CMVIS ‘self-management’ under CRC. He discussed notions of sustainability and
ownership and mentioned the need for an exit strategy if CRC is to take over CMVIS
management from HI-B, as well as the need for a capacity review on the part of CRC
management. Before taking any action, the acting Director of Planning commented he first
wanted to discuss this with the Secretary General of the CRC.
Next, the acting Director of Planning left for Japan and contact was made with the second Deputy
Secretary General of the CRC. He was not aware of the previous meeting with the acting Director
of Planning, but equally expressed interest in managing CMVIS independently from HI-B. A
follow-up meeting between the second Deputy Secretary General and HI-B Country Director was
scheduled for February 10th 2006. This meeting was joined the CRC Director of Finance. Again,
CRC confirmed its interest in taking over the CMVIS project, although expressed doubts over its
ability to raise the funds necessary to run the project entirely without HI-B support in terms of
fundraising. HI-B TA raised concern over CRC’s lengthy hiring process of a new data base
supervisor as well as CRC’s inability to provide the CMVIS office with power during times of
outage. CRC’s responded that it is currently not able to either speed up hiring practices or
provide power to the CMVIS office. A last example is that the CMVIS webpage is on that of the
CRC. This means that CMIVS is dependent on the CRC for posting the monthly report on time
and for receiving information about the number of hits the site receives. Neither is happening on
a timely basis and each requires the TA to prompt the CRC multiple times. In all, the CRC has
yet to show that it is keen to take over the CMVIS project.
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CMVIS staff opinion about being managed fully by the CRC varies from general disinterest in
the topic, to one that sees no problems to one that is very keen to continue to have the CMVIS
project managed by the CRC. The latter opinion belongs to the CMVIS program manager. To
him, it is acceptable that the CRC is unable to provide power and is delayed in hiring a data base
manager. He trusts that CRC will resolve both issues as soon as it is capable.

1.2.2.2 CRC HQ and HI-B relations

Having reviewed CRC’s intent for its involvement in the project, this section will take a look at
the degree to which HI-B and CRC have worked together to strengthen their cooperation for the
ultimate purpose of increasing the capacity of the CRC to independently manage the CMVIS
project.
HI-B and CRC have now been working together with the CMVIS project for a total of ten years.
For the past three years, the HI-B Mine and Injury Prevention Coordinator reportedly worked
hard to establish a strong relationship with the CRC Director of Planning yet found little
receptiveness on the part of the latter to become actively engaged with the project. Beyond this, it
appears that little more has been done in terms of relationship building by the two agencies,
which represents the first ingredient of any capacity building undertaking. Whereas one would
expect regular meetings between the various HI-B departments and their counterparts in the
CRC, this apparently has not taken place in the past few years. Even though HI-B and CRC HQ,
for example, have some shared responsibilities for the financial management of the project, HI-B
and CRC financial staff has not yet worked together or even met regularly. This perhaps explains
the reason why cooperation between HI-B and CRC in terms of the CMVIS project remains low
today.
As a partner agency with a long term vision for the independence of any local project it supports,
one would anticipate HI-B to have planned clear activities with clearly formulated results that
would guide the process of strengthening CRC HQ capacity to manage the project. Thus far
though, Hi-B does not have a logic framework for its role in supporting the CMVIS project,
which in part explains the lack of clear HI-B activities and the absence of monitoring of results
and progress that would indicate the CRC’s capacity to manage the project independently is
being strengthened. It is in this area that HI-B’s role requires more attention.

1.2.2.3 HI-B support to CMVIS with developing and using a logic framework

In response to donor request, the CMVIS project has been using a logic framework sine 1998.
This frame was mostly, if not completely, developed by HI-B Mine and Injury Prevention
Coordinator and the HI-B ISPA TA.
Reviewing CMVIS’ log frame and project activities, three issues come to the fore. The first being
incongruence in the log frame at a number of levels. The second issue is that it only measures
changes achieved by the project in the shorter term. And the third one is that staff work plans are
not aligned in any way with the project log frame. All three of these issues stand in the way of the
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project being properly monitored and, as a consequence, in the way of the project being managed
to achieve intended results. These issues are elaborated on below.
1) Incongruence in the log frame is evident at three levels. First, in that the third objective in the
log frame belongs in an HI-B log frame and not in that of CMVIS. It reads: ‘to support the
capacity and development of the Cambodian Red Cross in undertaking the activity independently
from HI-B’. A related objective does fit in the CMVIS log frame, but should read differently and
put CMVIS at the centre of the action.
Second, incongruence between CMVIS’ stated activities, objectives, primary outputs and overall
goal of ‘supporting a reduction in mine/UXO casualties in Cambodia and, ultimately, the
cessation of mine/UXO related impact on most affected communities’. Given stated project
activities, it is unrealistic that CMVIS will achieve the overall stated goal. As activities generally
flow from objectives, a leap of logic between objectives – activities and goals is evident.
Third, one of the two stated primary outputs of the project is not reflected in any of the three
project objectives in the log frame, and the frame (and thus the project) lacks activities and
indicators that could lead to its achievement. This output reads as follows: ‘the provision of
advocacy for mine-affected communities and mine/UXO victims and support to mine/UXO
casualties’. Yet, at the same time, some minimal related activities are conducted in the field by
the DGs.
All three of the above point to leaps of logic in the logic frame, which can only confuse matters
more for project staff who are already grappling with the concepts conveyed by the framework.
2) Project results, ideally, are measured at various points in time, i.e. outputs measure the
immediate result achieved by activities, outcomes measure the intermediate result achieved from
a number of outputs, and impact measures those changes that are achieved over the longer term
as a result of all project activities and their outputs and outcomes combined. Whereas change at
the level of outcomes should realize the various project objectives, change at the impact level
should match the vision portrayed by the overall goal of a project. Even though the CMVIS log
frame lists a number of outputs, the indicators of these outputs measure change interchangeably
at the output and outcome level. Which is which, is not clear.
3) The log frame could be better used as a pro-active management tool by CMVIS. This would
significantly strengthen CMVIS management capacity. Staff’s work plans, performance
evaluations 24 and monitoring systems could be more aligned with the log frame. The frame is
reviewed once a year with staff during the annual retreat. This review is limited to an assessment
of the degree to which (expressed in %) each activity has been achieved, rather than the degree to
which results of these activities have been achieved. The assumption that the achievement of an
activity automatically leads to the result outlined in the log frame is, purely that; an assumption.
Assuming that doing one thing (i.e. an activity) will automatically lead to another thing (i.e.
result) is evident of a leap of logic. Without logically assessing whether the expected result of an
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Current performance review templates used by CRC and HI-B are designed in a results-oriented fashion and
therefore lend themselves well to being used in accordance with a results-oriented log frame.
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activity has been achieved, it is of no use to solely assess to what degree any activity has been
achieved.
A last and related point is the project current development of Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP). These will provide guidance to the project and act as a complementary tool to the log
frame. Whereas the SOPs will assist with the HOW of the project, the log frame provides
guidance in terms of the WHAT. In other words, the SOP will show the step by step actions of
the project, and the log frame provides the reason as to why those steps are relevant.

1.2.2.4 CMVIS management capacity

It should be noted that for a project that should run in relatively straight forward manner, it was
difficult to get consistent information about the operations of the project from one staff to the
other. To arrive at a clear consistent picture of some aspect of the project, often more than two
staff would have been consulted.
For the day to day operations of the project, CMVIS is managed by one program manager who
reportedly uses the following management tools:
- Log frame work to assist with planning and management:
- Job descriptions/terms of reference
- Work plans (DG monthly plan and DMO and HI-B TA work plans)
- Activity reports (DGs, CMVIS staff activity and field visit report)
- Additional feedback from DG monthly visits and quarterly meetings
- CMVIS staff weekly team meeting
- Annual strategic retreat
- Staff performance review
- External inputs from HMAs and NGOs
A description of these tools follows below.
As mentioned in the previous section, CMVIS could be better at using the log frame as a ‘living
document’, but rather as one that receives attention once per year as a way to report back to
donors on its activities. Project proposals to various donors outline a helpful list of performance
indicators, yet information for these indicators is not being systematically tracked and used to
modify project activities or initiate new ones. As described in great detail in section 1.2.2.3,
CMVIS management capacity could be strengthened greatly if the logic framework were to be
designed and applied in a logical fashion.
The job descriptions of the CMVIS staff seem mostly up-to-date, although the role of the data
operator reflects more that of a financial/administrative assistant. The use of monthly work plans
by the DGs has recently been instigated by the TMO TA. For DMO staff, work plans are not
made on an individual basis, but one is written for all DMO staff for a period covering four or
five months. Rather than DMO staff compiling these plans, the ISPA TA receives a list of
activities from each staff member and enters them into one document. HI-B TAs work plans are
also made and reflect the activities of both TAs.
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Meetings with field staff present as management opportunities. Three types of meetings with
DGs take place:
 DG monthly visits have been observed and serve the general purpose of DMO staff
maintaining regular contact with the field.
 DG quarterly meetings for the purpose of: 1) DGs report on their activities/share
experiences, 2) discuss their work plans, 3) establish best practices, and 4) report on any
difficulties they may be experiencing and receive training there where necessary
 A large seminar is held once a year and attended by all CMVIS staff and partner agencies.
The purpose of the 2005 seminar, for example, was (1) to strengthen the activities of data
gatherers and main volunteers, (2) to strengthen the cooperation and communication with
other projects, and (3) to provide a training skill on Mine/UXO Risk Education to data
gatherers and the main volunteers (4) seminar evaluation.
DMO staff meets weekly for an hour and annually for a few days. The CMVIS weekly DMO
meetings though are not held regularly. The program manager’s reason for this is that all staff is
hardly ever in the office at the same time. The annual strategic retreat was not attended by the
evaluator, but from the report focused on the discussing the degree to which each activity in the
log frame work was achieved.
The remaining management tools in use by the program manager are staff performance reviews
and feedback from end-users. Staff performance reviews for 2005 have yet to be done, reason
being that the program manager is awaiting the release of the reviews by CRC. External inputs
from HMAs and NGOs are received on an ad-hoc basis.
The general observation is that even though CMVIS engages a useful number of management
tools, they are used in an unsystematic fashion and in isolation from one another, thereby missing
the opportunity to act as an essential feedback loop that allows for learning and the subsequent
systematic implementation of programmatic changes and follow up on the impact such changes.
Please see section 1.2.3 for ways in which to make CMVIS management more systematic.
In addition, the program manager’s ability to manage the project appears to be challenged by the
fact that his management decisions are influenced by a number of, as he puts it, ‘bosses’. These
currently are the HI-B Country Director, the Directors of Planning and HR staff at CRC HQ, and
UNICEF’s Assistant Project Officer of Accident, Injury and Disability Projects. Compounding
the challenge is the change in HI-B staff in charge of CMVIS resulting in different view on the
anticipated future of the project.
Some examples of how the management capacity of the CMVIS program manager and ISPA TA
is challenged by receiving direction from the three different corners mentioned above follows:


Uncertainty about which agency is to support CMVIS in the future limits staff’s ability to
move forward on securing funding opportunities from new donors. In the course of his
work, the CMIVS program manager has met with agencies that have expressed interest in
financially supporting the project and asked to submit a proposal. He reportedly not
pursued these opportunities as it is yet undetermined who will support the project in the
long term.
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The CRC-HI-B MOU being signed at the end of January 2006 reportedly led to CRC’s
hesitation to post the data base supervisor position as it was unsure whether funds would
be secured to pay for this position, leaving the project, which depends on the proper
functioning of a data base, without a data base supervisor for more than five months



The delay in reviewing CMVIS staff performance due to the fact that CRC has yet to
distribute the 2005 annual performance review forms. This hampers the program
manager’s ability to re-direct staff on an annual basis and limits his ability to manage
staff.



Revision of the DG deployment scheme that would have seen withdrawal from some paid
staff from certain areas last year was discouraged by UNICEF as it intends for the DGs to
take on data collection on casualties other than mine/UXO as part of a wider injury
surveillance system

In sum, and put metaphorically, there appear to be too many cooks in the kitchen that are
meddling with the soup.
1.2.2.5 CMVIS current staff capacity to operate without HI-B TAs

The proper functioning of the CMVIS project requires skills in a wide variety of areas. Appendix
H) contains a table that was drafted by the CMVIS program manager and TAs that outlines these
various technical and non-technical tasks and provides percentage points to indicate to which
degree these tasks are now performed by CMVIS, HI-B, or CRC HQ staff. If HI-B decides to
phase out of the CMVIS project, it could use this table as a baseline against which future progress
in regards to increasing CMVIS capacity and decreasing HI-B involvement is measured.
A detailed assessment was made of the degree to which CMVIS staff could manage the various
tasks of the two TAs given time, capacity and resources. This was done by asking each TA to
indicate which of his tasks could be performed by CMVIS staff, given time, capacity and
resources. Independently from the TAs reviewing their tasks, the same question was posed to the
program manager. It was interesting to find out that many of the tasks the TAs considered could
not be carried out by CMVIS staff, the program manager felt it could. Two key observations can
be made from this, each one of which gives rise to a question.
First Observation
Hi-B TAs appear to be working in operational roles, rather than in an advisory and capacity
building ones as one would expect from technical advisors.
This gives rise to the question whether the project would simply have enough manpower to
complete all tasks currently done by the TAs? This in turn demands a review of the number of
staff in the CMVIS DMO office as well as their apparent ability in the past few months to
complete all their tasks even though power outages reduced their time by 46 hours in the past two
months and they have had to operate without a data base supervisor for more than five months.
One may expect that this has caused a delay in response to ad-hoc requests, but this does not
appear to be the case. In fact, the response time is increasingly becoming shorter, indicating that
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staff is coping quite well despite the staff and power shortage. As ARC-View capacity of current
staff including TAs is limited, one may also expect that the 2005 annual report, to be published in
June 2006, may suffer in quality. Unfortunately, timing will not allow this evaluation to comment
on this as it will be completed by the end of March 2006.
A review of current man power reveals that, in addition to operating without the data base
supervisor, the one operator on the project seems mostly occupied with administrative work, and
supporting the program manager with various tasks, particularly where these concern supervision
of the drivers and cleaner, as well as financial matters with CRC. In fact, when asking the name
of her position, she was described as the project’s assistant to the program manager and the
cashier. This has led to the bulk, if not all, of data entry and analysis being done by the field
supervisors (in addition to their other tasks) and the one volunteer.
Moreover, CMVIS has employed a cleaner for years. The DMO office is small and may require
cleaning for 30 minutes a day. Beyond cleaning, which is done poorly, the cleaner’s task is to
prepare tea, run documents over to the CRC office, which is across the street, check newspapers
for any mine/UXO incidents and aid with mailing out monthly and annual reports. Together, the
cleaner’s tasks require at most one hour a day. Perhaps not surprisingly, the program manager
encouraged her for sometime to become involved in data entry, but she was not interested in
taking on other tasks. As a result, she spends a significant amount of time being unproductive.
CMVIS also employs two full-time drivers, the need for which is clear during the first four
months of the year when both field supervisors and TMO TA spend significant amount of time in
the provinces. It is questionable though if they are needed during the remainder of the year.
It has to be said though that in the past two months, CMVIS has been asked to share its data base
development expertise with two different agencies, namely Jesuit Relief Services (JSC) and the
Association for Aid and Relief, Japan. Although sharing its mine/UXO casualty data base system
with other mine/UXO affected countries is part of its mandate, helping agencies developing other
systems is not.
Reflecting on the above, one would think that, given appropriate training, CMVIS staff would
have time to take over the various tasks now performed by the TAs. This leads the discussion to
areas for capacity building.

Second Observation
Given the HI-B currently supports the project in a number of areas, CMVIS staff will require
training if the project is to operate successfully without the support of the TAs. This raises the
question: ‘what steps has HI-B already taken to support CMVIS to independently manage the
project?’ An inventory of previous capacity building efforts reveals that staff capacity has been
strengthened in a number of areas, but not all. The following table outlines past capacity building
interventions.
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Training Received
Proposal writing
Monitoring and Evaluation
Project Management X 2
Microsoft Certified Professional
Accounting Theory
Quick Book
Financial Management
Microsoft Access

Who
Program Manager
Field Supervisor
Program Manager
Program Manager
Data Base Operator
Data Base Operator
CRC Director of Program Department
Cleaner

* CMVIS program manager missed fundraising workshop he had committed to last year due to the fact that the CRC
organized a seminar/workshop he had to attend which took place on the same date

1.2.2.6 HI-B capacity

The ability of the HI-B TAs to strengthen the CMVIS project is hampered for a number of
reasons that are described below. The first reason being that both TAs appear to be working in
operational, rather than advisory roles. This is true more so for the TMO TA than for the ISPA
TA, but applies to both. At the time of the evaluation, their work was instrumental in the CMVIS
project carrying out its various activities. This creates a challenge for both TAs, as instead of
standing on the sidelines provides support and advice; they have become players equal to the
CRC staff. Although the relationship between the TAs and the program manager is good, this
seems on the one hand to have blurred the TAs objectivity and, as a result, their ability to provide
direction to the project as they should in their role of TAs. On the other hand, the close
partnership between the program manager and the TAs may have decreased the program
manager’s receptiveness to make changes based on the advice of the TAs. The above is evident
from the fact that both TAs report to the program manager as if he were to be their supervisor,
rather than work with him as equals. Although this is more so the case for the TMO TA, it
applies to both.
A second and related reason is that their involvement in the direct operations of the project limits
their capacity building potential. Whereas the TOR for the ISPA TA outlines some operational
tasks, it also includes some capacity building activities; this is not the case for the TOR of the
TMO TA. The TOR of the latter predominantly describes operational tasks and does not even
once mention the transfer of monitoring capacity to the project staff. This is contrary to what one
would expect, as the focus of the TMO TA should be the building of staff capacity.
Considering that technical advisors are generally lent to a project to strengthen one aspect or
another and that only for a definite period of time, and considering that HI-B has provided two
full-time TAs to the project for more than seven years, one is left questioning what HI-B’s longterm vision is for its involvement in the project. From the project’s experience, one gathers that
HI-B will continue to provide TA support. If support is ongoing, it is likely to be less focused on
capacity building and more on operations. This indeed seems to have been the primary focus of
the various TAs that have worked with the project.
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A third reason that may explain why HI-B TAs ability to strengthen the CMVIS project is
hampered is a lack of congruency between the general objective in the ISPA TA TOR and
described duties. The general objective states that the ISPA TA will:
- Develop the analysis capacity of CMVIS staff
- Promote the use of national data base as planning and monitoring tool
- Ensuring the VA assistance role of CMVIS
- Build institutional capacity of the CRC in terms of data base administration and overall project
management.
Corresponding duties, however, are only given for the fourth item, and none for the first three.
The TOR for the TMO TA is, in this regard, congruent.
A fourth and last reason as to why HI-B’s capacity building efforts may have had limited effect to
date is the capacity of the TAs themselves in the areas of results-oriented frameworks as well as
advocacy. This evaluation took the opportunity to increase TAs knowledge in these two areas.
This resulted in understanding the value of a log frame in managing for results, rather than
activities, and in the notion of advocacy no longer being simply understood as encouraging or
referring victims, but rather as speaking on behalf of someone in order to improve the situation of
this person. This fact that the notion of advocacy was not properly understood is not odd, given
that the terms ‘advocacy’ and ‘referral’ are both translated as one and the same word in Khmer,
with the meaning ‘referral’.
The one skill area that remains in need of strengthening with the assistance of some outside
support is the interpretation of data for the purpose of advocacy for mine/UXO casualties.
Although donor proposals list the activity of analyzing trends in incidents and the provision of a
baseline for monitoring the impact of VA and mine action programs, this is currently not done.
This is likely due to the project’s limited data analysis/interpretation ability. An example of how
data analysis could be used to monitor of VA services and to provide advocacy for casualties
follows: a query of the CMVIS data of which type of casualty (amputee, blind, burns, etc.)
receives victim assistance services will reveal which type of disability is most likely to receive
victim assistance services. Such a query could point CMVIS to raise the awareness of victim
assistance agencies of this fact. As it is CMVIS’ task to analyze the data, use it to monitor and
support its role as an advocate for mine/UXO casualties and then promote an as wide as possible
application of the data, it is in this area the project could benefit from some outside support.
As for the work of the TMO TA specifically, the following: the current monitoring system used
by the TMO TA is could be more strongly linked to the CMVIS project log frame. As a result of
questions asked during the evaluation, the TMO TA recently realized the importance of
indicators and is in the process of developing these. This will aid the systematic collection of
data. The TMO TA clearly understands the importance and concept of monitoring for results.
During the course of the evaluation, changes have already been made to the monitoring process.
It is anticipated that this will also change the focus of field trips, from ones that are limited to
joining the field supervisors on their visits to victims and authorities for the purpose of data
collection alone, to ones that focus on monitoring the results of all CMVIS activities. These
should include the various VA activities of the DGs, including the liaison with VA agencies and
possibly other agencies that are in a position to provide assistance to victims. The findings of
each visit is reported in a field trip report that provides detailed descriptions of the visit that
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currently takes approximately eight hours to complete. Discussion with the TMO TA provided
input into how to reduce the length of these reports by limiting the reporting to findings and
recommendations. Changes to the TMO TA reporting have already been made.
The pending completion of the SOP will aid to further strengthen the monitoring process by
providing step by step information about the various activities to be pursued during field trips.
The monitoring framework will function to inform the purpose of these activities. In sum, the log
frame, monitoring framework and SOP should all be designed in such a way as to complement
one another.

1.2.3 Recommendations
1.2.3.1 HI-B to formulate strategic plan for CMVIS and to increase cooperation with partner
agency

For the successful management of CMVIS by CRC CMVIS staff, it will be of utmost importance
that HI-B, CRC and CMVIS formulate a vision for the project, set a clear strategic direction for
the project and outline the chain of command. This chain needs to not only be communicated
with CRC and UNICEF, but also outline who is ultimately in charge. Based on this, clear
expectations of the decision-making role of the CMVIS program manager need to be formulated.
Regardless of whom HI-B considers to be CMVIS’ partner organization in the future, HI-B
would be wise to adopt an exit strategy. This exit strategy would of course detail to whom the
project would be handed over, include HI-B support for the partner agency’s review of its current
capacity to successfully manage the project and outlining HI-B activities intended to strengthen
the partners’ capacity in response to this review. This strategy would also include what results
HI-B expects of these capacity building activities and indicators of these results by which HI-B
could track that the partner agency’s capacity is increasing. Adopting such an exit strategy would
ensure the gradual transfer of responsibilities, but only if and when evidence of the partner
agency’s capacity exists. This plan would also include activities such as for example HI-B’s
building of relationships with the HR and financial departments of the partner agency.
If the CRC, or any other partner for that matter, is to fully manage CMVIS, it would be
responsible for obtaining funds as well. One way to do this is for the partner to pursue new
funding avenues. HI-B may propose to its current donors the possibility of funding the CMVIS
project directly through the partner. This may require HI-B's support in building a relationship of
trust between the partner and current donors. In essence, this would be one of HI-B's objectives to
be achieved prior to the transfer of responsibility for CMVIS from HI-B to CRC. In other words,
this part of capacity building will be the responsibility of HI-B and be stipulated as part of its exit
strategy.
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1.2.3.2 Review and revise CMVIS logic framework

A short, half day training in results oriented planning, was given to CMVIS staff on February
20th. The purpose of this workshop was to explain the difference between planning and managing
activities and planning and managing for results.
CMVIS staff, together with a results-oriented logic framework consultant, is recommended to
review and revise its logic framework. The current frame needs to be updated in the following
areas:
- Revise the logic framework by deleting the third objective and replace it with an objective
that puts CMVIS in an active role, i.e.: ‘CMVIS to explore ways in which it can ultimately
manage the project without management, technical and financial support from HI-B’
- Ensure congruency between CMVIS’ stated activities, objectives, primary outputs and
overall goal. Current activities will not lead to CMVIS overall goal of ‘supporting a
reduction in mine/UXO casualties in Cambodia and, ultimately, the cessation of
mine/UXO related impact on most affected communities’. For CMVIS to realize this goal,
it will have to add advocacy, whether this it be to the government, mine action operators
or victim assistance and community development organizations, as a major activity set.
Given that this may compromise the project’s much respected neutrality (see section
1.3.2), it may choose not to do this. If so, it should revise its overall goal and make it
more realistic
- Conceptualize the changes the project wants to achieve over time and determine which
activities will lead to immediate changes (outputs), which group of results combined will
lead to changes in the medium term (outcomes) and how all of the work of the project
will contribute to achieving CMVIS overall long term vision, i.e. goal (impact)
- Create results indicators and decide on what information needs to be collected to inform
these indicators, who will collect that information and when
With donor approval, a framework as attached in Appendix I is proposed. The content of this
framework is shown as an example of one way in which it can be completed by CMVIS staff.
The SOP that currently being designed will need to be aligned with the various activities outlined
in the log frame. Together, the two should be used as management tools, with the log frame
providing the reason for under taking certain activities and the SOP outlining the steps involved
in these activities.

1.2.3.3 Strengthen CMVIS management tools

CMVIS currently uses the log frame as a reporting tool for donors that is reviewed once a year
and then pinned to the wall, rather than as an active management tool. As mentioned earlier, for a
project that should be run in a relatively straight forward manner, it lacks the rigor one would
expect to support it. The absence of standard operating procedures to date underscores this point.
The value of such a management tool has thus far simply not been recognized.
CMVIS management capacity would gain significant strength if it were to base operations on its
updated log framework; one that is reviewed, and if needed, adjusted on a quarterly basis. Rather
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than reviewing the activities outlined in the log frame during the annual retreat, staff could report
on the results that were achieved and on how these contribute to reaching CMVIS’ overall goal.
Whereas the ISPA TA currently compiles staff activities for the quarterly CMVIS work plan,
each DMO staff should create their own. Once CMVIS has reviewed and revised its logic
framework, each staff member should create their own annual log frame, clearly detailing the
overall purpose of their role in the project, activities, results and indicators. Staff could then align
their quarterly work plans to this log frame. This would allow them to become deeply familiar
with linking their various activities to results, and then to monitor for these. If CMVIS is to truly
use the log frame as a management tool it would be wise to parallel its training, monitoring and
reporting activities to the project’s log frame. This will enhance its ability to plan and modify
activities based on whether anticipated results are delivered or not and ultimately, ensure it
reaches the greatest impact possible.
DMO and HI-B staff is strongly recommended to hold weekly meetings, even though not all staff
are in attendance. This would allow for follow up on previously discussed items that required
action. Meeting minutes would allow absent staff to be informed, thereby enabling them to
contribute to next week’s meeting. Regular meetings, perhaps on a bi-monthly if not monthly
basis are also recommended for HI-B, CRC and CMVIS leadership.
Staff performance reviews need to be done either at the end of each year. Instead of using the
CRC performance review form, it is advised for the program manager to discuss with CRC the
need for developing its own template, one that focuses on the main activities of each staff and the
concrete results achieved as a result of these activities.
CMVIS management capacity will also be enhanced if recommendations for HI-B outlined in
section 1.2.3.1 were to be followed up.
1.2.3.4 Consider reducing number of CMVIS staff at DMO

Reviewing the entire DMO staff situation, the project has now been functioning without a data
base supervisor for more than five months. The project seems to have managed without this staff
positions, calling into questions if they are needed. Funds for these positions should still be
available, and perhaps with donor approval, can be used to towards other activities that are now
not being pursued for reasons of cash shortage (i.e. volunteer training, printing CMVIS brochure,
repair of vehicle, purchasing a generator…, to name only a few).
CMVIS is advised to review the performance of the full time cleaner and two full-time drivers.
Based on this performance review, it should be decided if performance is satisfactory as well as if
the project requires the full-time support of these three staff.
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1.2.3.5 Train CMVIS staff in selected topics

Dependent on the decision to either continue HI-B TA support to the project, or to slowly
withdraw, the CMVIS project would benefit greatly if all staff, field and DMO alike, were trained
in planning and monitoring activities in response to the degree to which anticipated results were
achieved.
Further areas of training for DMO staff are:
- Arc View Mapping
- English Written and Spoken Language Skills
- Data Analysis 25 and related Advocacy
- Partnership building
It will be important for CMVIS and HI-B to incorporate training activities into their log frames;
to define expected results in terms of CMVIS’ increased capacity to run the project without TAs
and to monitor for these results.
1.2.3.6 Strengthen role of HI-B TAs

Again, dependent on HI-B, CRC and CMVIS’ decision regarding the future of the project, the
following recommendation will, or will not be relevant. If HI-B plans to eventually phase out its
support for the CMVIS project, it would be wise to ensure that TAs work mostly in a capacity
building role, rather than in an operational one 26.
In addition, it would be most beneficial for each of the TAs and the program manager to review
the roles and responsibilities of each TA. From the comparative task assessment described in
section 1.2.2.5, this would allow for more clearly identified roles for the TAs and for many of
their tasks to be transferred to CMVIS staff. This would free the TAs up and allow them to focus
on building the capacity of CMVIS staff in those areas where their capacity is still lacking.
Further, the project would benefit if the knowledge of both TAs was strengthened in the creation
and application of results-oriented logic frameworks, and in the use of data analysis for advocacy
purposes. The former could be achieved by the TMO TA and ISPA TA studying literature on
results based management provided by the evaluator. The latter could be achieved by setting up
regular meeting with CMAA data base staff and AVI TAs, both of whom have a solid back
ground in analyzing data. Notions of advocacy should be shared amongst the group, and ways to
interpret the data for the purpose of advocacy explored. Of course, this should only be done by
CMVIS if it is clear on its advocacy role, whether this is in the mine action sector and/or VA and
community development in general.
It should be noted though that the ISPA TA is currently being pulled away from his tasks at
CMVIS to support HI-B related activities that were previously attended to by the HI-B Mine and
25

CMVIS ‘analytical’ work is currently limited to descriptions of the statistics.
As for the PM, he sees the support of the ISPA continue as is for the current year and to be reduced to half-time in
2007. Ideally, the PM sees the TMO become CMVIS staff.
26

40

Injury Prevention Coordinator. This is happening during a particularly busy time of preparing a
number of annual reports, including the CMVIS 2005 annual. All require significant time and
input from the ISPA. It should be appreciated by HI-B that requesting the ISPA TA to attend to
other matters leaves less time to work with the CMVIS project, thereby reducing the capacity
building potential of HI-B TA.
1.2.3.7 TMO TA to transfer monitoring capacity to field supervisors and data gatherers

Long-term sustainability of the project would be strengthened if the field supervisors and the
DGs themselves engaged in a process of monitoring for results. Once the TMO TA has
established a monitoring framework that monitors project activities for their results, it is
recommended to train first the field supervisors and then the DGs in this technique. This would
strongly enhance their learning in that it would invite them to measure the appropriateness and
effectiveness of key project activities and identify modifications to activities and new initiatives
needed to reach optimal results.
Summary of Recommendations
1. HI-B to formulate strategic plan for CMVIS and to increase cooperation with partner
agency
2. Review and Revise CMVIS logic framework
3. Strengthen CMVIS management tools
4. Consider reducing number of CMVIS staff at DMO
5. Train CMVIS staff in selected topics
6. Strengthen role of HI-B TAs
7. TMO TA to transfer monitoring capacity to field supervisors and data gatherers
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1.3

CMVIS DEPLOYMENT
BENEFICIARIES

SCHEME

AND

RESPONSIVENESS

TOWARDS

Evaluation Objective
To assess the CMVIS deployment scheme and its expected responsiveness towards
beneficiaries [i.e. mine/UXO victims and their families]; propose a revised scheme of
intervention if required making the best use of CRC volunteer network
Key questions:
- To what degree is CMVIS current deployment scheme of field staff and volunteers
responsive to the needs of beneficiaries?
- What deployment scheme of CMVIS field staff and volunteers would best serve the needs
of beneficiaries?

1.3.1 Current Situation
CMVIS currently employs fifteen full time and three part-time DGs. Of these 18 DGs, 13 are socalled provincial DGs (PDGs) and 5 district DGs. Provincial level DGs, as opposed to district
level DGs travel to Phnom Penh (PP) once a month to hand over their casualty report forms as
well as those of the district DGs. They also submit monthly work plans, receive their salary and
discuss any questions that may have arisen during the past month.
In the words of the DGs 27, their main activities are: (1) data collection, (2) emergency victim
assistance (VA) in the form of CRC household product kit, encouragement and referral, (3)
provision of mine risk education (MRE), and (4) reporting mines and UXO to HMA agencies.
As for VA services, DGs provide both direct and indirect VA; direct in the form of providing
clothes and food (meat, noodles and rice) obtained from the CRC and indirect through their
liaison with victim assistance NGOs. DGs work according to a newly implemented work plan.
When there are no new casualties in the cover area, DGs will travel to approximately four to five
high casualty villages each day to ensure new casualties are being reported and included in the
data base. As mentioned, the plan is flexible and allows DGs to respond immediately to any new
incidents that may occur.
CMVIS DGs have been providing VA services since 2000, but only began tracking these in 2004
and only to casualties who were injured after 1997. Main volunteers are not involved in providing
VA, and MRE, or EOD reporting. EOD reporting by CMVIS started in December 2004. The
CMVIS MRE activity is even newer and only began in the beginning of 2006, with training
provided to DGs and main volunteers during the annual seminar in December of 2005. MRE
resources are currently limited to a photo book. According to UNICEF 28, posters, brochures and
other educational materials will only be provided to DGs once they have received more training
at the end of 2006.

27

From KAP survey conducted with DGs March 1-3 2006
From, interview wit UNICEF’s Assistant Project Officer of Accident, Injury and Disability Projects, on March 7th
2006.

28
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1.3.2 Main Findings
Most of the findings in the following section are informed by the Knowledge, Attitude and
Practice (KAP) survey (see Appendix J). This survey was conducted with twelve DGs during the
first three days of March. This survey was designed to assess DGs capacity in terms of their tasks
other than that of data collection. It was developed, then translated into Khmer, tested with one of
the DGs by the evaluator and assistant/interpreter and consequently modified. Next, all twelve
provincial DGs that came to the DMO in early March were asked to provide their feedback. They
were provided with a translated version of the KAP, and were then interviewed three at a time by
the translator, who ensured questions were properly understood and answered as fully as
possible. DGs wrote their responses in Khmer, which were later translated into English.

1.3.2.1 DG deployment and responsiveness toward beneficiaries

The question to be answered is whether CMVIS field staff and volunteers are currently deployed
and responsive in the best possible way to the project’s stated output of support/referral source
and advocacy for mine/UXO casualties. This question cannot be sufficiently answered by
considering staff deployment alone, and demands a review of field staff VA activities and results
of these activities as well. The following sections present related findings.
DG deployment solely considered from the point of view of beneficiary support is appropriate. In
areas with high number of casualties, DGs are responsible for a smaller geographic area, thereby
spending less time on travel and allowing for more time to provide victim assistance services.
When asking DGs the question whether they feel their workload is appropriate given their
various tasks, including VA, all commented the workload was appropriate. Though they viewed
their responsibilities as significant, they consider that they don’t need help from others or for
their load to be reduced. Only one DG (BTM province) noted he can help the other DG in his
province if he is absent.

1.3.2.2 Victim assistance activities of data gathers

The DGs consider their VA role as comprised of referral to casualties to VA agencies and any
other organization that can offer support. They will help casualties with filling out forms for
service at the Provincial Rehabilitation Centers (PRC). For most of the DGs that were surveyed,
this referral does not go beyond telling the casualty and their families of available services. For a
few (4 out of 12), this support includes actively looking themselves to find these services. Visits
and encouragement are both named by DGs as important ways to help victims.
DGs collaborated and communicated with a significant number of agencies, NGOs and other
service providers in order to provide assistance to mine victims and their families in the year
2005 (see Appendix K). Due to a lack of reporting, it is however unclear what resources were
made available to casualties as a result. Although not reported directly by the DGs, one of
CMVIS reports to a donor states that 100 wheel chairs were made available by the CRC through
the DGs to casualties during the period September 2004 to August 2005. The program manager
explained that these were not reported by the DGs as the Field Supervisors provided them.
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In a select number of provinces, the DGs will provide emergency supply of house hold products
in the form of a CRC kit. This kit contains items such as a sarong, cotton scarf, canned fish, rice,
clothes, mosquito net, blanket, and soap. As is evident from Appendix L, this is only the case in
five provinces and supported a dismal total of 48 persons. With a total of 865 casualties in 2005,
this means that only 5.5 % of all casualties received some immediate support from the CRC.
Why only so few kits were provided in only so few provinces is hard to tell. It could simply be a
matter of DGs not reporting this information, or simply a lack of kits made available by the CRC
When some of the DGs in the other provinces were asked why they were not providing the kit,
they advised that the CRC in their province did not have the resources to purchase the products
for the kits. Later queries revealed that many of the provincial CRC offices are unable to raise
funds to purchase emergency goods.
Surprisingly, three of the 12 DGs surveyed did not obtain any services for casualties, even though
the DG in Kampong Cham reported 61 casualties; the DG in Svay Rien 16, and the DG
responsible for five provinces surrounding the PP area 27 in 2005 (see Appendix E and L). All
but one of these 104 casualties were caused by UXO incidents. The DG in the PP area reported
that ‘his’ casualties either died from the impact or were not disabled. Still, this leaves 104
casualties and their families in seven provinces without any support, whether this is a kit from the
CRC or other services to help the family cope. This likely is not only due to the DGs lack of
connections to service providers, but also due to the fact that providers are scarce in some of the
provinces. The DG working in the PP area should, off all DGs, have access to multiple resources
given the number of agencies that work in the area.
On a field trip to Mondol Kiri two agencies were located, both of which could aid in one way or
another, yet had previously not heard of the CMVIS project. A lack of knowledge about available
services on the part of the DGs, field supervisors and TMO TA is evident and does in part
explain why only limited resources are being made available to casualties.
DGs expressed their frustration at not being able to provide help to casualties from before 1997,
as well as with not being able to link victims in general to vocational rehabilitation or
employment opportunities.
1.3.2.3 Data gathers victim assistance success stories

During a field trip to Battambang in January of 2006, DGs Dy Kimsay and Khim Khern shared
what they considered success stories in terms of providing support to mine/UXO victims and
their families:
In 2004, I met a woman with disabilities. She is an above-knee amputee. The woman; moreover,
has just given [birth] to a baby. As a result, she couldn't go to Battambang Provincial town to get
a wheelchair, even [though] I told her everything is free: transportation.... Seeing so, I decided to
bring her the wheelchair and after that [the] CRC team which is based in her district,
Sampovloon gets this information from me and gives her [a] kit which consists of a sarong,
noodles, clothes, rice, and a kromar (Dy Kimsay – Interview January 19th 2006).

44

An anti-tank victim got a severe injury on 26 March, 2005. The victim's family at that time
referred him to Emergency hospital in Thailand because they were very worried about his
conditions at that time. Just one day after the accident, I reached the victim's house. His wife
complained [to] me a lot about the high cost of the treatment in Thailand. In such a condition, I
tell her about the free services hospital in Battambang. 'It is Emergency Battambang where you
needn't pay even a small amount of money', I said to his wife. Knowing this information, his wife
feels very happy and promises me to take her husband back from Thai to the Emergency
Battambang (Dy Kimsay – Interview January 19th 2006).

Four fathers from four different families die[d] of [an] anti-tank explosion. It was in 2003, in
Koah Kralor district where I met the families. Being a Data Gatherer, I decided to contact CRC
hoping that the four families [could] get help. As I expected, [the] CRC gave the families some
kits consisting of a sarong, noodles, rice, a kromar, and clothes (DG Khim Khern – Interview
January 21st 2006).

In January 2005, I met a woman with disability living in Prek Taveng Village, Prek Kreng
Commune, Mong Rahsey District; the woman is a two-leg amputee. As you can imagine, she is
always finding herself hard to move everywhere. Later on, I on behalf of CRC brought her a
wheelchair (DG Khim Khern – Interview January 21st 2006).

These stories provide good examples of the various ways in which the DGs help casualties,
although at the same time it is evident that they have yet to understand their role as advocates.
This does not negate their incredible good will, often providing small amounts of their own funds
to families, or whatever else they can contribute that would help out.

1.3.2.4 CMVIS – UNICEF partnership

In September of 2005, CMVIS and UNICEF began a unique pilot project that sees emergency
funds made available for renovating the house of a select number of casualties. This project will
run through until October 1st 2006. It was developed without the support of HI-B and funds are
directly made available by UNICEF to CRC. These funds are to be used by two DGs in the two
provinces of Preah Vihear and Otdar Meanchey.
The experience of a villager in Ek Pheap Village, Pal Hal commune, Tbeng Mean Chey district in
Preah Vihear Province serves as a good example of how this project is assisting casualties. This
villager lost one hand when using an improvised explosive device crafted from an UXO to catch
fish. A grant of $USD 92.77 (371100 Riel) from the UNICEF was provided and a new zinc roof
was purchased for the house.
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1.3.2.5 MRE activities of data gatherers

DGs were only just trained in MRE in December, and have only been providing it since January
of this year. When asked what activities they conduct to increase mine/UXO risk awareness, they
named the following: ‘tell people about the mine/UXO, knowledge of mine/UXO awareness
especially children, making sign for mine/UXO affected area, kinds of mine/UXO, don’t do any
activities in the mine field, selling or buying mine/UXO to... .’ When asked how they perceive
their role is in supporting mine/UXO victims, they invariably consider their MRE activities to be
part of their VA role.

1.3.2.6 EOD referral activities of data gatherers

As mentioned, CMVIS has been referring UXO to mine action agencies since December of 2004.
It does this through the completion of an EOD referral form, which is submitted by the DG to
mine action operators active in their area, or to the DMO if none are active locally. For example,
from September 2004 to August 2005, a total of 5416 UXO and 1581 mines were reported.
Whereas it makes perfect sense to report UXO, as they are often visible, the reporting of mines is
somewhat questionable as they generally are hidden from view.
A researcher working on an EOD sector study commissioned by Norwegian People’s Aid shared
that EOD teams have been able to collect significantly larger amounts (500%) of UXO due to the
increased availability of data on the location of UXO by CBURR, CBMRR and CMVIS.
Whereas before, EOD staff had to knock on doors to ask about the whereabouts of UXO, these
projects now provide information on the presence of such to the EOD sector.

1.3.2.7 Training and monitoring of VA and MRE components

As discussed in section 1.2.1, the current TMO TA has been with the project since September
2005 and has expanded the monitoring role beyond that of monitoring data collection to also
include monitoring of victim assistance activities and management of the project. Though results
of the project’s activities are not being tracked in a systematic way, the current TMO TA has a
fairly good sense of what is important to monitor.

1.3.2.8 Consideration of gender

Out of the 18 DGs and 7 main volunteers, only one is female. Issues of safety, as well as women
not applying for the post, were mentioned as the main explanation for this by DMO staff. When
the DGs were queried about the same, all but two out of twelve, commented that women can be
as good DGs as men. Only two cited safety concerns as the reason why women can’t be DGs.
The gender distribution amongst volunteers is better, with 285 women and 562 male volunteers.
In other words, 34% is female.
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1.3.2.9 Data gatherers perceived lack of resources

When asking DGs for suggestions that would improve their work performance, they offered the
following listed below, all of which related to the provision of more resources to the DGs:
- CMVIS to provide some resources to victims (rice, mosquito net). DG Khim Khern now
pays for these items of out of his own pocket
- Provision of funds (approximately USD$60) for occasional overnight accommodation
when the travel distance is great (150-200 km)
- More funds for motorcycle repair, gas and ferry fees. The current allowance of USD$30 is
not sufficient. DG Khim Khern now pays for these expenses himself
- DGs communicate by mobile phone, yet no funds are available. The suggested amount is
USD$10
- Work on the weekend if incident occurs but unable to take a day of in lieu
- Provide uniforms, now only shirts are given, no pants

1.3.3 Recommendations
The main objective of the third objective of this evaluation was to review whether the CMVIS
deployment scheme of DGs and main volunteers is responsive to beneficiaries to the best of its
possibility. This has been found to be the case and no suggestion for changing the deployment
scheme is made. Many other recommendations are made though, all of which seek to increase the
influence CMVIS has on reducing the impact of mine/UXO incidents on casualties and their
families.
1.3.3.1 Clarify intent of project in terms of its VA role

CMVIS could significantly increase its influence on reducing the impact of mine/UXO incidents
on casualties and their families. Although this purpose is reflected in CMVIS stated primary
outputs and goals, it is not evident from the objectives outlined in the log frame. This was
discussed at length in section 1.2.2.3 and 1.2.3.2. Dependent on what stance CMVIS decides to
take on its advocacy role, it may either need to update its objectives or scale down its stated
primary outputs and overall goal. This decision will influence the degree to which the following
recommendations are relevant.
As a note aside, it was interesting to find out that of the five HMA agencies, CMAA and
MAPU/AVI that were interviewed as part of this evaluation, only two were aware of the VA role
of CMVIS, thereby suggesting CMVIS role outside the provision of data is not known to its main
end-user group.
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1.3.3.2 Increase links with VA and CD organizations and initiate partnerships

Most, although not all, of the DGs currently have a fair to reasonable understanding of services
available to casualties in a given area. Realizing this, the TMO TA requested all DGs to create a
VA book, in which they are to note down the name of each VA organization and the services they
provide. This is a good start.
Awareness of VA and community development (CD) agencies that could support casualties is
limited, if not almost non-existent, at the DMO level. DMO staff is recommended to strengthen
both their knowledge and relationship with such agencies. For the program manager and ISPA
TA, this would include doing research to find out which agencies in PP with offices in the
provinces could possibly support casualties, and to begin to build relationships with these
agencies at a head quarter level. This would facilitate the provision of services to casualties
through the DGs at the provincial level.
The TMO TA and field supervisors should work to increase their knowledge of such agencies in
the provinces as well and establish relationships with them. The resources that could become
available as a result of this should not be underestimated. During a field trip to Mondol Kiri
(MK), for example, contact was made with two agencies: KAMA and International Cooperation
of Cambodia (ICC). There is dearth of agencies active in MK, yet the main volunteer who
worked here for many years as DG had not established contact with either. KAMA provides
support to individual families and was actually already involved with one family who was
involved in a UXO incident, but was not yet aware of a small child who had become blind as a
result of another incident. As a result of stopping in, this boy will now be supported by KAMA,
who had never before heard about CMVIS.
Neither ICC or KAMA were aware of CMVIS and were very interested to learn more about it.
Moreover, ICC they asked if CMVIS would require any Phong translation services, and if so,
they could provide those for free! MRE posters and brochures could thus become accessible to
the Phong tribe, five members of which were seriously injured in a UXO incident last year.
To this end, CMVIS is recommended to update its brochures by including some samples of
victim assistance information that can be drawn from the data it collects and to distribute this
together with a monthly report to any agency they meet on their travels to the provinces.
Lastly, CMVIS DMO is strongly advised to follow up on invitations of VA and CD NGOS, to
submit a proposal for a joint project that would make much needed emergency and other
resources available to casualties and their families. The Director of Operation Des Enfants de
Battambang (OEB) apparently discussed this with the program manager at the end of last year,
but this proposition has yet to be carried out.
Lastly, it is interesting to note that to data, CMVIS has not received any queries from CD
organizations. This could be either because they don’t know the CMVIS data exists, or because
they do not know how it could be useful to them. CMVIS staff is recommended to strengthen its
ability to analyze the CMVIS data in a way that could be useful to CD organizations and then to
promote the use of this data to these agencies.
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1.3.3.3 Training DGs and CMVIS DMO staff to increase VA capacity

Current results in terms of VA and advocacy are in line with what one would expect given DGs
capacity (knowledge, attitudes and behavior) and resources (time, money, equipment such as
mobile telephone and motor bike) available.
CMVIS is recommended to strengthen its victim assistance advocacy role by training all CMVIS
staff, including DGs in advocacy and partnership building.
DGs self-identified 29 the following areas for training:
- Communication/information sharing & partnership building with NGOs
- Mine risk education including mine/UXO recognition
- First aid
- Limited English language skills in key technical terms related to their work, such as
referral versus advocacy, results, partnership
In addition to the above areas, it is also recommended for DGs to be trained in analyzing the data
so that they can ensure that end-users encountered in the field understand how the data can be
used to benefit their work and the lives of their clients. DGs named a few other areas in need of
training, namely administration and computer skills, however these were not considered relevant
by the evaluator given DGs tasks.
As discussed in section 1.1.3.1, volunteers CMVIS ought to be provided with a refresher course
at least once a year. This training would be best designed and delivered by the DGs with support
from the field supervisor and TMO TA. In those areas where there DGs are not employed, this
training should be delivered by the field supervisors and/or TMO TA.
Further, the quarterly meetings with the DGs should be used to strengthen DGs understanding of
their victim assistance role. DGs should be asked to prepare for these meetings by continually
updating their knowledge about services available in their areas and by forging new partnerships
with agencies. As an encouragement to do so, a small incentive scheme that allocates perhaps a
CMAC mine awareness T-shirt could be used to encourage DGs to expand this part of their
responsibilities.

29

From DG Knowledge, Attitude and Practice survey March 1-3 2006.
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1.3.3.4 DG to Conduct small survey into emergency needs of casualties

The most important needs of mine/UXO victims will vary dependent on who you ask. This is
evident from the table 30 outlined below.

The DGs, with the support of field supervisors and TMO TA are advised to conduct a small
survey of emergency needs of newly injured casualties. The KAP survey indicates that DGs feel
that more financial support is needed in the direct aftermath of an incident. As most casualties are
poor, the initial cost of transportation to a hospital and medical treatment puts most families into
debt for the rest of their life. CMVIS role would be much stronger at this stage if it were to be
able to provide some much needed financial support. In order to identify the need for this, DGs
are encouraged to conduct a small survey of casualties. Based on the information contained in
this survey, DMO staff could write up a small proposal that requests items ranging from cash
funds, to food and training to organizations like the World Food Program and AusAid, to name
only two.
1.3.3.5 Strengthen reporting of DGs VA role

Field supervisors have traditionally focused their work on the data gathering activity of the DGs
alone and need to be much more focused on improving the way in which each DG carries out his
VA activities.
As a result perhaps of the lack of attention on the part of DGs to the VA role of CMVIS, DGs VA
activities are underreported. Proper reporting of these activities will enable both the field
30

From: The role of Mine Action in Victim Assistance, p. 34, published by the Geneva Centre for International
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 2004.
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supervisors and the TMO TA to evaluate this aspect of the DGs work and to provide appropriate
guidance to improve it.
1.3.3.6 Implement criteria for follow-up of casualties that are severely injured

As already discussed in section 1.1.3.1, criteria need to be developed to ensure that data collected
on casualties accurately reflects on the situation. This is particularly true for the information
contained in category 9 in the casualty report form (see Appendix A). Invalid data on this
category reflects poorly on the work of VA agencies and may misinform end-users relying on
this information. As severely injured casualties in need of prosthetic are generally only fit a
prosthetic six months after the initial injury, DGs would be wise to ensure these casualties are
followed up at least more than half a year after initial contact.
1.3.3.7 Strengthen DGs MRE activities

Beyond the identified need for more MRE training, DGs could increase the impact of their MRE
activities by distributing mine awareness (MA) posters, brochures and other materials available to
educate communities about the risks they face from mines and UXO in their environment.
Although Chhaya Plong 31 from UNICEF suggested waiting with the provision of materials until
DGs have received further training, DGs themselves reported they felt ready to use materials
appropriately. The evaluator supports this and recommends MA materials being made available
to the DGs and main volunteers.

1.3.3.8 Strengthen DMO follow-up of EOD referrals to HMA

CMVIS should implement a system for following up on CMVIS generated reports for explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD). UXO are being reported, yet CMVIS lacks mechanisms whereby it can
follow-up if EOD teams actually disposed of the ordnance. CMVIS is recommended to meet with
CMAC and JMAS EOD HQ staff, as well as with that of other mine operators with EOD capacity
to devise a feedback system that would ensure reported UXO are responded to. Again, this may
take CMVIS into the advocacy direction it purportedly adheres to in written documents, but has
yet to commit to in practice. Deciding whether CMVIS wants to take on an advocacy role in mine
action will determine the relevance of this recommendation.

1.3.3.9 Initiate system for reporting mine marking and MRE referral

As DGs are acutely aware of the need for mine marking and mine risk education (MRE), a
reporting system similar to that for EOD should be created. As with EOD referrals, it should
implement a structure for ensuring that referrals are being followed up on.

31

Interview March 7th 2006.
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1.3.3.10

Investigate provincial CRC lack of emergency kits

It is unacceptable that CRC in only the five provinces of Preah Vihear, Siem Reap, Kratie,
Kampong Speu and Odor Meanchey has emergency kits available. As a CRC project, CMVIS
DMO staff ought to investigate the cause of this and request CRC HQ to take decisive action.
CMVIS is advised to follow this up closely and to report back to CRC HQ if this situation does
not improve. Equally important will be to emphasize to DGs the need to report on any resources
made available through them for casualties.
1.3.3.11

Review and modify field Supervisors responsibility

The two field supervisors currently share field supervision duties for the entire country. This
would not be an issue if their tasks were limited to spot checking casualty forms. This has been
the focus of their work in the past, but since DGs also have a VA and MRE mandate, it will be
important for field supervisors to follow up on the results of these activities as well. This will
require their solid knowledge of which VA services are available in a given area, as well as their
building of relationships with the organizations providing these services. For this purpose, it
would be beneficial, if not paramount, that field supervisors each are responsible for a select area.
This would also strengthen the relationship between DGs and their supervisors and allow the
latter to be more knowledgeable and thus better monitor the VA role of the DGs for which s/he is
responsible.

1.3.3.12

Ensure monitoring framework reports systematically on VA results

With increased reporting by the DGs on their VA activities and increased supervision by field
supervisors of these activities, field trips by the TMO TA can be better targeted to collect
additional information from the DGs and VA agencies; information that informs both quantitative
and qualitative indicators in turn serve to improve CMVIS VA component.
A strong monitoring system that focuses on results will ensure that CMVIS reaches the intended
output of providing advocacy for, and support to, mine-affected communities and mine victims.
Tracking results would enable CMVIS to decide whether existing activities need to be modified
or new activities initiated.
The flow chart currently used by the project to show its monitoring framework only shows
processes in place to ensure that the data collected is reliable. Once the project has revised its log
frame and according management tools to be more results oriented, it would be wise to create a
flow chart that describes monitoring processes for all of CMVIS work.

1.3.3.13

Increase number of women DGs and volunteers

CMVIS currently faced a gender in-balance. This is true at DMO level, where only two of the
seven paid staff are female, and even more so at field staff level, where only one staff member is
female amongst a total of 18 paid staff. This suggests the need for more creative advertising of

52

CMVIS positions, for example through existing informal networks of women or community
groups that are connected to women. The preferential hiring of female staff is recommended until
a more equal male/female representation is achieved. In addition, CMVIS is advised to consult
with the one female DG about ways in which it could promote more women to work as DG.
In similar fashion, CMVIS is advised to focus on recruiting female volunteers.

1.3.3.14

Consider increasing DGs resources

DGs currently pay for work-related expenses out of their own pockets. This is hardly fair. The
current gas and motorcycle repair allowance of USD$30 does not consider the area covered by
each DG and generally. DGs report this allowance is insufficient. DG Khim Khern, for example,
pays for these expenses himself.
CMVIS should provide evidence of the number of kilometers traveled by each DGs and
accordingly request for an increase in DG funds for travel and request for more funds if the
evidence collected supports this.
More funds should be made available for motorcycle repair, as well as to pay for ferry fees when
needing to cross a river to reach an area and to pay for an occasional overnight accommodation
when the distance to be traveled by the DG is great. Lastly, DGs communicate by mobile phone,
yet no money is provided for this expense. CMVIS should add DG mobile phone expenses as a
line in their 2007 budget.
Summary of Recommendations
1. Clarify intent of project in terms of its VA Role
2. Increase Links with VA and CD organizations and initiate partnerships
3. Training DGs and CMVIS DMO staff to increase VA capacity
4. DG to conduct small survey into emergency needs of casualties
5. Strengthen reporting of DGs VA role
6. Implement criteria for follow-up of casualties that are severely injured
7. Strengthen DGs MRE activities
8. Strengthen DMO follow-up of EOD referrals to HMA
9. Initiate system for reporting mine marking and MRE Referral
10. Investigate CRC lack of emergency kits
11. Review and modify field supervisors responsibility
12. Ensure monitoring framework reports systematically on VA results
13. Increase number of women DGs and volunteers
14. Consider increasing DGs resources
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1.4

HUMANITARIAN IMPACT

Evaluation Objective
To assess the humanitarian impact of the project on mine action practitioners' work in terms of
strategy formulation and priority deployment... This includes demining agencies, HMA NGOs,
CMAA, PMAC, MAPU, CBMRR …
Key question:
To what degree does CMVIS currently meet the information needs of end users as it relates to
their ability to formulate strategy and decide on priority deployment?"

1.4.1 Current Situation
CMVIS is considered by many as a unique tool for mine action in the world. The 2004 End User
Satisfaction study revealed that although there was room for some improvements, the system
meets the needs of end-users.
CMVIS current end-user group is diverse, but can be roughly divided into three main categories:
- Humanitarian mine action and associated agencies and authorities, such as CMAC,
CMAA, MAG, HALO, MAPUs, JMAS
- Victim assistance agencies such as PRCs, Veterans International (VI) and the Cambodia
Trust
- National and international organizations such as embassies, donors, international support
agencies like for example the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining
(GICHD)
As stated in the UNICEF 2005-2006 project proposal, end-user support provides the overall
rationale for the project and CMVIS depends on the interest and support of end-users,
communities and local authorities for its continued relevance. As with any data base, it is
paramount to know what information end-users require and in what format it can be best
presented. This evaluation set out to better understand the degree to which CMVIS currently
meets the needs of end-users as well as to solicit feedback about areas for improvement. This
work was informed by formal semi-structured interviews (for interview guide, see Appendix L)
that were held with the following HMAs and supporting agencies:
- Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) – Deputy Director General, and Director of
Operations;
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG) – Country Program Manager
- HALO Trust - Country Program Manager
- Japanese Mine Action Services (JMAS)- Chief of Finance, Project Manager, and Country
Representative
- Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) - Director of Planning and Socio-Economic,
Data Base Director and Technical Data Base Advisor
- Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU) Banteay Meanchey - Australian Volunteers (AVI)
Technical Advisor
- Norwegian People’s Aid – Deputy Program Manager
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1.4.2 Main Findings
1.4.2.1 Quality of cooperation with CMVIS

HMA end-users are satisfied with the degree of cooperation with CMVIS. They applaud CMVIS
for the level of support it has given. In general, they find it straight forward to get information;
consider the distribution of the data to be good and the quality of the monthly and annual reports
high. One informant commented that one cannot speak about mine action without using
information provided by CMVIS as it is the government’s goal to achieve 0 victims by 2012, and
0 impact by 2015. Another agency (HALO) had a differing opinion and stated that they like
CMVIS and are keen to see it remain, but that they do not believe it is in any way crucial.

1.4.2.2 Suggestions for strengthening collaboration

A number of the HMA and supporting agencies suggest that CMVIS needs to better analyze
WHO is their customer and WHAT is their need. A few (HALO and NPA) indicate the level of
collaboration is good and does not need to be improved.
JMAS proposed they would like to work more closely with CMVIS in the field. Reason being
that from the monthly report and special requests it is not clear: what kind of situation exactly led
to the incident and what kind of UXO was involved in the incident? JMAS now has to go the site
of the incident, which is time consuming. The agency therefore suggested increasing the
collaboration between JMAS and CMVIS DGs and volunteers at the provincial level. This would
allow for the sharing of local up-to-date casualty data between JMAS provincial staff and
CMVIS field staff. This idea was apparently discussed one year ago with the CMVIS Program
Manager, who expressed his interest.
1.4.2.3 How do end-users use CMVIS information

HMA and supporting agencies use the CMVIS information for a wide variety of purposes that are
listed below in alphabetical order:
- Checking areas of clearance in annual PMAC work plan for relevance given CMVIS
casualty data
- Area reduction: if CMVIS does not report any incidents then operators will check validity
of area reduction process and reduce the L1Survey suspect area
- Funding proposals
- Advocacy
- Planning, deployment of mine action (justification for selection of target areas)
- Baseline information to analyze situation.
- Report writing
- Situational analysis
- Planning and monitoring of EOD, CBMRR, CBURR, Technical Survey Teams (TST),
MA and mine clearance teams
- Monitoring and evaluation
- Presentations to donors and other key audiences
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-

-

Planning, prioritizing EOD
Development of strategic plans
Technical support
Coordination
Annual demining prioritization planning process (accident location and numbers in any
mine affected community are essential criteria in their selection for the demining plan.
This data is considered alongside other developmental needs of local communities, but is
one of the most important. This data supports the provincial demining action plan each
year)
OLAP (Online Analytical Processing) Cubes, analysis related to specific
activities/operations

Quite a few of those interviewed suggested they would be better served if CMVIS were to collect
some additional types of information. These suggestions will be discussed in section 1.4.3.1.
In as much as HMA agencies use the CMVIS data to plan deployment, they also use data other
than CMVIS in order to prevent accidents, namely access to resources/utilization of resources,
land pressures, i.e. socio economic impact. CMVIS is seen as providing historical monthly and
annual information. For most agencies, operations are not based solely on CMVIS data alone but
used as one component/indicator in the planning process. For others, CMVIS data merely
supports rather than leads their thinking.
In the words of HALO Country Program Manager 32 from HALO Trust: ‘It is clear from the
present distribution if mine clearance resources in Cambodia that the detailed information
contained within CMVIS has little influence over deployment planning or donor funding. Thus,
although it is a good supporting argument for mine clearance in general, and is particularly good
for showing overall progress, it therefore should not be thought of as essential.’

1.4.2.4 Perceived reliability of CMVIS data

The degree of perceived reliability of CMVIS data varied from agency to agency and ranged
from 60%– 70% according to AVI/MAPU and JMAS to 85% – 95% by NPA and 100% by
MAG. CMAC considered the data to be reliable for 80% and HALO Trust as more than 95%.
JMAS explained their low confidence rate due to the fact that casualty for one month seems to
change when requesting same information the next month. The average confidence rate of DGs 33
is 95%, with 90% being on the low end and 100% on the high. CMVIS office staff rate the
reliability of the data as 99% from 1999 onwards, and 80% prior to 1999.
CMAA and MAG both commented that they are not sure if the casualty data east of the Mekong
in Ratana Kiri (RTK) and Mondol Kiri that is collected by main volunteers is complete. US
bombing data shows that this area was as heavily bombed as Kampung Cham. Yet, RTK reports
significantly lower numbers of casualties compared to those reported in KC. Access to the RTK
32
33

Email communication March 1st 2006
Information gleamed from DG Knowledge, Attitude and Practice survey conducted March 1-3 2006.
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is high due to access to Vietnam, thereby predisposing it to levels of casualties similar to those
seen in KC. The question is if casualties in this area are under reported due to the fact that they
are receiving care across the border in Vietnam. A recent field trip of CMVIS staff to RTK for
the purpose of ensuring no casualties were missed showed the main volunteer in this province
had done his work thoroughly. Efforts to increase collaboration with hospitals along the border as
well as Thai CRC were made by CMVIS and CRC HQ staff. As significant challenges were
encountered, CMVIS staff traveled to Thailand to visit five hospitals and again encountered
difficulties in obtaining information as to whether Khmer casualties had received treatment. Only
one casualty was reported, and apparently returned back to Cambodia shortly after.
CMAA also reports that in past 2-3 years, CMVIS’ data has been increasingly accurate,
particularly in terms of the provision of accurate GPS coordinates. This is reportedly evident
from the increasing correlation between CMVIS data and that of HALO and CMAC.
CMAC noted they trust the information to be reliable 80% of the time and particularly so if
people survived the incident, but doubts whether CMVIS is capturing all the casualties that die as
a result of the incident.
HALO notes that CMVIS seems to gather all of the accidents that we hear about, although the
reported activity at the time of the accident is not always correct as people will not admit to be
demining when it is judged an illegal activity.
From AVI/MAPUs 34 “…limited observations working in the field and comparing with the
CMVIS data, there seem to be discrepancies or missed information within the CMVIS dataset.”
This is based on the incident location, which sometimes could be misleading if the location is
incorrect. The village [MAPU] gathered information about historical accident information is very
questionable as well. Therefore we feel that CMVIS data is probably the best, most consistent
record that should be used as a base, and then supplemented or confirmed by village supplied
information.” AVI/MAPU suggest that on average 40% of the approximate incident location is
incorrect (i.e. mapped at village point, or location is clearly wrong due to typo in coordinate or
overestimate of distances). In other words, 60-70% (since 2002) is assumed to be correct. An
estimate of the more current (past two years) reliability by AVI/MAPU counts in as having
improved to approximately 80%.
1.4.2.5 Responsiveness and consistency of CMVIS to special requests

A total of 25 different end-users requested special information from CMVIS in 2005 for a total of
117 special requests (see Appendix M). Of these 25, ten are considered frequent users.
HMA agencies, CMAA and MAPU/AVI reported that CMVIS is becoming increasingly more
consistent and swift in its response to special requests. End-user feedback indicates though that
the response time varies dependent on the requesting agency. CMVIS program manager for
example, was once requested by the Secretary General of the CMAA to abort a field trip in
Battambang in order to respond to a special query. Whereas some agencies such as the CMAA
34

MAPU AVI Technical Advisor, email communication March 13th 2006
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and CMAC generally only have to wait one day, and sometimes not even that, others such as
MAG and MAPU have experienced waiting for specific information for a couple of weeks. The
current average response rate is 2-3 days, with returns of information sometimes being as quick
as the same day and sometime as long as a few weeks.
As for repetitive requests for the same information at different times, CMVIS appears challenged
to send out the information on a regular basis and in a format that is consistent. MAPU 35, for
example, require regular and consistent data sets of raw accident data. For MAPU staff to use the
data they need a consistent and accurate incident location. Since this was not happening, MAPU
supplied a template to CMVIS, although requests were still returned with incomplete and
inconsistent fields of information differing from the initial template. This reportedly has been
improving lately. MAPU/AVI reports that CMVIS data usually arrives from CMVIS within a
week of request and that DMO is responsive to suggested changes.
MAG’s experience has been much the same as that of the MAPUs. It has had to prompt the DMO
office repetitively for special reports that supposedly should be sent automatically a monthly
basis. Whereas MAPU and MAG have trouble receiving consistent information, JMAS does
receive consistent categories from one special report to the next, yet has also had to prompt
CMVIS to get it each time. Moreover, JMAS request for monthly specialized reports could not be
honored due to the program manager reportedly being too busy.
HALO reports a different experience. The CMVIS team reportedly has always responded
favorably to their requests for additional assistance. HALO appreciates the close collaboration
between its staff and the DGs and note that, each month, they receive an additional update to the
standard report giving us more details as to the exact whereabouts of accidents. HALO sees no
requirement for better collaboration on this front.

1.4.2.6 CMVIS responsiveness to end-user feedback

CMVIS does not solicit end-user feedback, but is responsive to this feedback when it is given in
unsolicited fashion. As with any data base though, it can not be everything to everyone. One
request is a good point in case of the challenge inherent in trying to respond to all requests. Early
on Monday morning March 6th, the CMAC Secretary General, phoned one of the TAs about the
need for ‘real’ numbers in the CMVIS monthly report, rather than percentage points to express
for example the distribution between those killed by mine/UXO accidents and those injured. The
program manager explained that this is not the first time they were posed with this question.
Foreigners generally want CMVIS data expressed in %, whereas this poses a challenge to the
Khmer audience who would prefer the data in real numbers.
Interviewed agencies were asked how responsive CMVIS had been in the past to feedback. Not
all of the agencies interviewed had provided CMVIS with suggestions in the past, but those that
had (HALO, NPA and MAPU) reported CMVIS listened and had made changes accordingly.
NPA once requested a change in the way CMVIS gathered data about the type of device that
caused the incident. Since more agencies had offered the same advice, CMVIS called a group
35

Ibid
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meeting and changes to the data collection process were made.
CMAA also perceives CMVIS as responsive, noting that when it recently suggested for CMVIS
to increase its MRE and VA activities, it responded favorably.
Interestingly, CMAC noted that it had never made any suggestions for change. Reasons given
that the system is perceived as already designed and CMVIS as not being interested in receiving
feedback. In the words of CMAC, there appears to be a lack of understanding from both sides and
suggested there is a “need to open doors”.

1.4.2.7 Awareness of CMVIS services by current end-users and potential users

A number of HMA agencies queried to what extent CMVIS services are known to agencies
outside the HMA, VA, donor and embassy community. Although this evaluation did not
specifically look into this point, it has become apparent during that community development
organizations, for example, could benefit greatly from the information gathered by CMVIS but
simply are not aware of its existence. Such awareness may also lead to much-needed services
becoming available to casualties.
In similar vein, of all the five HMA, CMAA and MAPU/AVI that are end-users, five were not
aware that CVMVIS has a website from which reports could be downloaded, or aware that
CMVIS has a mandate beyond that of data collection.
1.4.2.8 End-user perspective on providing financial and technical support to CMVIS

Through the channel of HI-B, CMVIS is supported financially by international donors. With the
anticipated decrease in funds for mine action in general, it will become more difficult for CMVIS
to compete for the increasingly scarce resources. This evaluation briefly discussed with HMA
agencies, CMAA and MAPU/AVI whether it would be interested and able to financially support
the project, whether through a fee-for-service subscription, general funds, or technical assistance.
MAG, CMAA and MAPU commented they could provide the project with some limited technical
assistance although this would have to be strategically planned and formalized. Four of the five
HMA agencies (MAG, HALO, JMAS, and NPA), on the one hand, supported the idea of a
paying a subscription fee, but commented that their expectations for service as a result would
likely increase. CMAC, CMAA and MAPU/AVI, on the other, felt strongly that the information
should be available free of charge. HALO offered an interesting suggestion in that as a result of
initiating a fee structure, the system would no longer be widely available. As a result, it would
lose its impact as an independently verifiable source and, as such, its value to the subscriber.
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1.4.3 Recommendations
The following recommendations were made in large part by the HMA and related (CMAA and
MAPU/AVI) end-users. It is interesting to see the large number of suggestions made, indicating
that CMVIS would be wise to solicit end-user feedback and to do so on a regular basis. This
should much improve the degree of usefulness of CMVIS Data to current and potential end-users,
and thereby enhance its humanitarian impact.

1.4.3.1 Solicit end-user feedback on regular basis

CMVIS currently does not solicit end-user feedback. If it does so, it does so on rare occasions, it
is done in an ad-hoc manner. This is a major short coming of the project, as the first priority of
any data base should be its thorough understanding of the information needs of the end-users.
CMVIS needs to create a mechanism by which it can be informed, and continue to be informed
about the current and changing needs of its various end-users.
CMVIS needs to solicit end-user feedback and is strongly recommended to set up regular
meetings to do so. It may introduce the meeting by providing some of the suggestions described
below as a way to begin the discussion.
Suggestions for improving the type of information collected by CMVIS were made during this
evaluation. Some examples of these suggestions follow below:
- Identify if those incidents that take place due to people farming happen on their own land,
for others working on private land or on public land (knowing what percentage of
incidents occur due to people working on private land perhaps lead to the mine action
community proposal to use the law to penalize rich land owners who pay farmers to work
on land that is mined)
- Identify those incidents that have 0 casualties
- Better clarify the category ‘nothing- exploded beside victim'. From this category it is
unclear whether people just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time; were
wandering through a field as someone detonated a mortar; were actually watching
someone else deliberately handle a UXO out of boredom or passive thrill seeking, or
where possibly even assisting in the process?
Meeting with end-users would also provide CMVIS with the opportunity to increase their
confidence about reliability of data on casualties involved in incidents in the border areas.
Give the challenges experienced by CMVIS in collecting data from hospitals in Thailand, and
given that casualties will return to Cambodia after treatment, the missing of casualties in the
border area is perceived as presenting the little risk to the overall integrity and reliability of the
database.

1.4.3.2 Standardizing process for sending out special repetitive requests

CMVIS currently lacks a system that would allow it to send information automatically to enduser groups that request data on the same categories at different times. This system could simply
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retain the type of request and prompt the person in charge for sending out the information that it
is time to do so. Its process for responding to repetitive special requests needs to be standardized
and formalized to ensure the regular consistent delivery of data to all those agencies requesting
similar information at set time intervals.
Following up on and implementing the following recommendations would increase the
humanitarian impact 36 of CMVIS according to all agencies, except HALO, that were interviewed.

1.4.3.3 Strengthen partnership with CMAA & increase compatibility of data

The current partnership between CMVIS and CMAA is carried out in an ad-hoc fashion; no clear
lines of communication exist and meetings are held on an irregular basis. Better information
sharing could take place if the link between CMAA and CMVIS was stronger. This would enable
the mine action community to access all demining related data in one place.
CMAA itself made some suggestions for changing its relationship with CMVIS:
- CMAA invites CMVIS to have all international requests for casualty data to go through
the CMAA, thereby allowing CMAA to represent mine action in Cambodia
internationally and making it the responsibility of the government
- CMAA also specifically suggests for CMVIS to provide all raw data, i.e. for CMAA to
have full access to the data base. According to CMAA, this would require a formal
agreement between CMAA and CRC, would increase CMAA ability to query data while
at the same time not needing to bother CMVIS to provide the information
CMVIS is recommended to consider the above, but only once a more formal partnership with
CMAA with clear guidelines has been established.

1.4.3.4 CMVIS to collect more accurate incident location data

The CMVIS incident location information is currently not considered reliable by MAPU/AVI.
MAPU’s work is spatial in nature and thus the ‘locational’ accuracy of the incidents is absolutely
critical. For MAPU, accuracy to within 100m would be ideal, but it should be out by no more
than 500m. As the data is currently not reliable, it reportedly remains difficult to interpret the
method by which location of incident is recorded. MAPU/AVI believes there are inconsistencies
in the way that the GPS coordinates, bearing and distances are recorded by DGs. When distances
and bearings are taken from village, MAPU needs the exact GPS coordinates of location in
village, rather than simply the name of the village. As some of the villages are very long, not
knowing from where the compass reading was taken affects the final incident location. MAPU
36

MAPU/AVI provides some food for thought on the role of incident data on HMA planning processes: “Incident
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would like to assume that if GPS village coordinates are not provided and that compass readings
are taken from the Village Centre Point. When, however, adding up Village Centre Point GPS
coordinates, distance and bearing, the incident location not infrequently appears to be either
across the border or in an area not know to be suspect. Thus before any confidence can be put in
the location of the incidents, clarification of existing data is required.
CMVIS’ provision of accurate incident location information is anticipated to become more
important with the introduction of IMSMA4 to Cambodia. MAPU/AVI 37 foresees that the one
place where all mine action related data will be stored and accessed will be IMSMA v4, which is
to be implemented by the CMAA in the near future. The new IMSMA version 4 is an information
management tool, at the core of which is GIS mapping. The map links all the various demining
information together whether it be suspect areas, demined or surveyed areas, and of course
incidents (for which there is even its own category). All the text based information can be
accessed from this map, and thus is more intuitive than the last IMSMA version.
Once all the demining operators utilise IMSMA v4, it will be paramount for CMVIS to ensure
the ‘locational’ accuracy of its incident data. It is anticipated that this would not only allow
CMVIS to best serve its clients, but improve the uptake and use of data as well. The foreseeable
implementation of IMSMA4 can act as a catalyst to both strengthen the partnership with CMAA
(as discussed in section 1.4.3.3) and to review the way in which it collects, enters and records
incident location data. CMVIS would remain the casualty data expert. The following
recommendations are made in this regards.
1) Using IMSMA4 as a catalyst, CMVIS is recommended to revise its process for recording
incident location, and possibly to review existing ‘locational’ data for the past two years
(MAPU/AVI suggested time frame), before it is imported into IMSMA. This would enable the
entire mine action community to use the same data in the same way.
2) In the absence of GPS capacity on the part of some field staff, use paper maps or aerial photos
with a Grid plotted on top of them in the same coordinate system as the GPS. Those staff
equipped with GPS is recommended to add the use of aerial photos. This would enable DGs to
cross reference their GPS and compass readings and for DGs and main volunteers alike to invite
feedback from the casualty and/or local community as to where the incident occurred. MAPU and
CMVIS have already discussed they would pilot this method in the two BTM districts of
Salakrau and Ou’Chrov.
3) Make procedural changes to the way in which DMO staff checks field data. Increase DMO
staff mapping and GIS effort and/or capability so as to be able to check the reliability of the
coordinates submitted by DGs. Create a definitive SOP about recording, interpreting and entering
the data.
4) Create an extra column named ‘off set’, to indicate whether the incident location is a precise
location or one for which one needs the bearing and distance to calculate the exact location

37
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As both MAPU/AVI and CMAA rely heavily on the GPS coordinates provided by CMVIS, it is
recommended for CMVIS to meet with both to fully understand their information requirements.
HALO, JMAS, CMAC and NPA, however, do not use the incident location GPS coordinates. For
MAG, incident location information is not very important; it is considered indicative but not
definitive. The agency does plot the data as a way to better understand clusters of casualties.
Once CMVIS improves the ‘locational’ accuracy of its incident data, and this data is imported
into IMSMA4, it is anticipated that the uptake and use of this data by mine operators will
significantly increase.
1.4.3.5 End-user feedback on monthly and annual report presentation

End-users provided valuable feedback about the presentation of the monthly and annul reports.
NPA suggests the following areas for improvement:
 Monthly report to provide information on not only the number of casualties, but on the
number of incidents as well
 CMVIS to provide information about the chain of information from point of accident to
data collection by DG was greater.
The following feedback on the presentation of the monthly and annual report was made by the
interviewees:
CMAC suggest the need for monthly reports to report on annual data ranges, rather than from the
month it reports on back to the same month last year (for example, May 2004 to May 2005)
HALO 38 comments that “… the present presentation is flawed in that it reports the number of
victims rather than the number of accidents. The combination of this and running the "Most
Affected" tables over a variable period, ranging form 13 to 24 months, means that those tables
can be deceptive and hard to interpret. Ou Char in Battambang flew into the charts at Number
Three last year (presumably after the incident at the warehouse on April 1st), since then it
slumped to Number Five in December and then climbed back to Number Two last month despite
no other accidents being suffered in the intervening seven months. This is the most acute
example, but the general problem is accentuated across the "by district" and "by province"
tables.”
“Similarly when Prea Palay made it into the charts in November it was because 15 people were
hurt in a single incident, giving that one anti-tank mine (un-clarified) equal weighting as 15
separate AP mine accidents in Kouk Romiet is probably wrong.”
“The weaknesses that CMVIS has in our opinion are the use of the term "forest" which conjures
up images of the Cardamoms when more often than not it is describing the tree lines and scrub on
the edge of villages. We believe that the category of "common land" might be a better description
for many areas of intensive public ad-hoc land use which at the moment are stigmatized by the
term forest, as it does little to encourage further land use. Furthermore the term forest misleads
the reader over the definition of the problem in many areas, (Bob Keeley's UNDP study
38
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dismissed the idea of clearing the forests as too ambitious), when in fact we are talking about
clearing a 100m wide accident causing belt, often with cultivation taking place on both sides of
the belt.”
The following three suggestions were not mentioned by any of the interviewees but are relevant
given the topic of monthly and annual reports:
 The annual report lists the provincial level information in the order from high casualty
province to low casualty province. When in the field it proved difficult to find the
appropriate province because they are not listed in alphabetical order. This is something
worth considering and asking end-users about
 Ideally, the annual report is published as early in the year as possible so that media
publicity could be given to the release of the report and attention could be drawn to the
ongoing issue of mine/UXO risk in the country
 CMVIS would gain more recognition if it were to write a small column in a number of
papers every month that informs the public about the release of the monthly report and
provides one or the other interesting fact revealed by the data. This would be an
opportunity for CMVIS to alert potential end-users to its existence and would generally
raise the profile of the project

1.4.3.6 Promote use of OLAP-cubes

OLAP-Cubes is an Excel software system that is set up for individual users and comprised of a
number of categories of information. Once the OLAP-Cubes system is set up, raw data is
imported. This data can then be analyzed in whatever configuration the end-user chooses.
Although the initial set-up requires time, the subsequent sending out of raw data on a monthly or
quarterly basis (dependent on end-user need) is quick and easy.
It is one thing to collect data; it is another to apply it. From interviews, it appears that most of the
end-users are not utilizing the CMVIS data to the best of its potential. Ideally, all mine action
operators use the CMVIS data beyond the monthly report, yet many report that they limit their
number of special requests to CMVIS because they are perceived as being busy. Introducing
OLAP Cubes to those end-users that require the CMVIS information in multiple configurations
would save CMVIS time and increase uptake of information by end-users. Of all persons
interviewed, only MAG knows of the OLAP-Cubes system. When asking staff around the office
about OLAP-Cubes, only the ISPA TA knew the term and was familiar with the system.
This is a missed opportunity. As a way to promote HMA agencies to use CMVIS data more,
CMVIS needs to promote the use of OLAB-cubes amongst end-users and to teach them how to
use it. It would be worthwhile to mention this in the CMVIS brochure.
1.4.3.7 CMVIS to increase end-user capacity to interpret data

A few of the interviewees commented that end-users may not be able to interpret the CMVIS data
due to a lack of experience with such. They commented that most end-users use the information
for proposal writing but questioned whether it is used to the best of its possibility for deciding on
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deployment and informing monthly work plan. CMVIS is recommended to query with various
end-users if they would appreciate training on interpretation of the data. The provision of such
training is very much considered to be part of its mandate.
To this end, MAPU/AVI suggested for CMVIS to present commune and district level data at the
MAPU commune and district level workshop and give information on what the data tells about
priority areas.

1.4.3.8 CMVIS to consider options to ensure long term sustainability

From main end-user feedback it does not seem feasible to implement a fee-for-service structure.
Some support the idea, but just as many don’t. If it is implemented, it will be implemented for all.
Without the support of all, or at least the majority, the introduction of such a service would
effectively reduce the reach of the information, and as a result, its impact would be reduced. As
such, it is not recommended to initiate a fee-for-service structure.
The question of long term sustainability cannot be answered without reflecting on staffing
structure, salaries for whom constitute the single largest budget item. If not for a recouping some
of the project expenses through a fee-for-service system, the cost of the project could be
significantly reduced if it were to operate without Technical Advisors and if it could rely less on
paid Data Gathers and more on volunteers for collecting the data.
The former would require CMVIS to gain some more technical and management expertise, but is
essentially feasible. The latter is more challenging. If CMVIS were to use less paid staff, it would
have to depend more on volunteers. This would not be an issue, if only it wasn’t for the reliance
of two of CMVIS main end-users, CMAA and MAPU/AVI, on precise locational incident data,
which requires GPS tools and capacity. Without this requirement, CMVIS could consider
training, for example, police to collect the data; similar to the way in which CMAC trained 200
police in EOD. According to CMAC, most police are literate and the project has been quite a
success. The added benefit of police gathering this data would be that the police could enforce the
law on landowners there where casualties were injured working on mined land that was owned by
others. Using the law would act as an indirect strategy to prevent and, ultimately reduce,
mine/UXO incidents and casualties.
Summary of Recommendations
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Solicit end-user feedback on regular basis
Standardizing process for Sending out special repetitive requests
Strengthen partnership with CMAA and increase compatibility of data
CMVIS to collect more accurate incident location data
End-user feedback on monthly and annual report presentation
Promote use of OLAP-Cubes
CMVIS to increase end-user capacity to interpret data
CMVIS to consider options to ensure long term sustainability
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2. Analysis of Progress since Previous Evaluations
This section will report briefly on the progress made by the CMVIS project in response to the
recommendations made by two previous evaluations.
2.1 Data Base, Data-Entry and Reporting Systems Evaluation 2002
This evaluation made five main recommendations, three of which have been fully implemented,
with two still remaining, one of which is now being acted upon. These three are:


Be more pro-active in alerting sector specific groups to their findings by developing
detailed reports aimed at specific groups of users and the CRC field staff
This recommendation is much in line with one made by this evaluation, namely the ability
to interpret data and use it to advocate. The project’s ability to interpret and then use the
data for specific purposes remains low today.



Improve the documentation of the system by developing a) Data Collectors Handbook
explaining all aspects of the data collection process with a definition of terms for all of the
questions contained in the Mine / UXO casualty Report, and b) user and technical guides
for the CMVIS software to help the users and any future developers of the system

The recommendation to develop a Handbook is now being followed up through the development
of Standard Operating Procedures. This was not initiated by CMVIS staff, but by the HI-B Mine
and Injury Prevention Coordinator who recruited a volunteer to work with the project for this
purpose. This leaves one questioning whether the value of developing SOPs is recognized.
Without this recognition, it is unlikely that the SOPs will actually be actively used. The SOPs
were not yet completed at the end of this evaluation. Technical guides have been developed but
could be much improved upon.
2.2 CMVIS End-User Satisfaction Study 2004
The 2004 study made 12 recommendations, two of which were considered inappropriate by
CMVIS staff and a third for which consensus was missing. The ‘Creation of the position of
Liaison and Public Relations Officer’ was deemed unnecessary as “CMVIS is generally known
and appreciated nationally and internationally. And also, the CMVIS can be integrated to CRC
Web-site. 39” The recommendation to ‘Initiate a yearly satisfaction study’ was rejected because it
was considered “a waste [of] time and money 40.” General consensus was lacking for a third
recommendation, namely ‘To charge for extra and ad-hoc/customized reports’. In a coordination
meeting held with the CRC and HI-B in early 2005, it was decided to charge for extra annual
reports. When the project indeed tried to charge end-users for extra reports, end-users refused,
even though they had endorsed the idea when it was first proposed. Hence, further
implementation of this recommendation was abandoned.
39
40

From: Report on the Evaluation and Planning Seminar CMVIS 12 January 2005, no page
Ibid
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For the remaining nine recommendations, progress is described below.


Clarification of the definition of End-Users and updating list of beneficiaries
The definition ‘end user’ remains in use to describe the number of people who receive the
monthly reports. At the time of the study, the end-user list counted 800 people, which
after a thorough clean-up was reduced by 300. Today, though, the system again counts
over 800 users. A system for updating this list has yet to be devised.



Application of procedures
With the assistance of a volunteer, CMVIS staff is currently in the process of developing
and writing Standard Operating Procedures



To privilege the electronic mail delivery
At the time of the end-user satisfaction study, approximately only 50-70 copies were sent
out by email. Currently, of the total 886 reports sent out monthly, 291 are sent out
electronically within Cambodia and to another seventeen countries. The remaining 595
copies are sent out by regular mail to end-users in Cambodia and another seven
countries, of which six already receive an electronic copy.



To Play a Mine/ UXO Liaison Information Role
This recommendation suggested for CMVIS to increase its outreach activities by
initiating technical working groups. CMVIS has not done so and it is questionable
whether CMVIS is fitted for this role. The CMAA seems to be a more likely initiator for
this activity. As for the suggestion for CMVIV to work together with ‘humanitarian
sectors’ for the purpose of developing joint projects and conduct fund raising; progress
has been made. This is evident from the pilot project initiated with UNICEF. Yet at the
same time, CMVIS can do more and is encouraged to do so in this evaluation.



To make the CMVIS data’s accessible to all public
CMVIS has responded to this recommendation by making its monthly and annual reports
available on line. Greater awareness of CMVIS data could be achieved amongst
community development NGOs and ways in which to do this are presented in this
evaluation.



To initiate discussions and end-users interaction
This recommendation is much in line with one made in this report, namely section
1.4.3.1. Little progress has been made in this regard since the end-user satisfaction study.



To refine concepts and/or categories
Suggestions made no longer hold as the format of the monthly report has changed
significantly since the time of the end-user satisfaction study.



Qualitative information and further explanations of the data’s
The monthly report currently have less qualitative information that in 2004. From
interviews with mine action operators, CMAA and MAPU/AVI, it appears that the degree
of narrative provided is however considered sufficient. The recommendation to
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distinguish between the term ‘incident’ and ‘accident’ has not been followed up on and is
again made in this evaluation.


To simplify the CMVIS reports presentation and make it easier reading
Much progress was made in this regard. The current monthly reports are perceived as easy
to read and providing information as needed. Please refer to the recommendations in
section 1.4 for some minor suggestions that were made by mine action operators about the
presentation of the monthly and annual report.



To initiate a yearly Satisfaction Study
This was not considered feasible due to the associated cost. The essence of this
recommendation is still considered valuable by this evaluator; in that CMVIS should
devise ways in which to ensure that its end-users are satisfied. Ideally, this should not be
done by an outsider once per year, but by CMVIS staff on a regular basis.

3. Conclusion
The CMVIS project has been in existence in its current form for ten years. It is run by much the
same staff as it started with and it has much evolved since its inception. Its data gathering
activities have increased significantly, both in terms of geographic coverage, type and amount of
data collected. Its monthly and annual reports have changed from year to year, thereby showing
its ability to respond to changing circumstances. Whereas the CMVIS activities were at first
limited to collecting data alone, these now include the provision of MRE, victim assistance and
EOD reporting. Significant areas for strengthening these three activities were identified by this
evaluation. Many of these areas have been discussed with staff who showed their receptiveness to
suggestions by initiating changes, even before the evaluation was completed.
The advocacy role of the project needs to be clarified, whether this is for mine action or for
victim assistance. Once this is clear, the overall goal of the project needs to be reviewed and,
accordingly, the projects activities in the logic framework need to be adjusted. Whereas CMVIS
has primarily managed its activities in the past, it could gain much strength from managing for
results first. The achievement of expected results, or the absence thereof, would then guide
whether activities should continue as they had, or need to be modified.
End-users are generally pleased with the work of CMVIS, although encourage it to solicit
feedback, and to do so on a regular basis. The uptake of CMVIS information could be greater,
and avenues to do so are described in this document.
In closing, CMVIS is a project to be proud of. And, anything good always has the chance to be
better. CMVIS is equipped to do so and with renewed strategic direction from HI-B and CRC
will be able to live up to the expectation of achieving an even greater impact.
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Appendix A – CMVIS Mine/UXO Casualty Report
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Appendix B – DG Deployment
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Appendix C - Data Gatherer Field Contacts for 2005

D

DG's name

Province

Health District
VC CC Center Office
NGO

Sous Bunsoeurn
Sao Leang

Kampong Speu
Kampong Cham

V
V

Yim Kimsean
Khoun Puthy

Pursat
Svay Rieng

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

CMAC
NCDP
CMAC
CBMRR
DCO

Khim Khoeurn

Battambang

V

V

V

V

Pich Phat

Kratie

V

V

V

V

CMAC
Catholic
Church
CBMRR
OEB
VI
CMAC

V

LUPO
VI
MAG
CRC

Kov Ping

Preah Vihear

V

V

V

Mann Sa Im

Banteay Meanchey

V

V

V

V

Ok Pon

Kampong thom

V

V

V

V

Noun Srean

Phnom Penh

V

V

V

V

ZAO
PLG
WFP
JSC
CMAC
CWS
ADHOC
CMAC
LICADHO
WCC
GTZ
WVC

VA

Volunteer

Police Victim Other

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

JSC
CFDS
CRC V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V
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DG's name

Lim So

Yean Nora

Ly Kimheng

Province

Pailin

Odor Meanchey

Siem Reap

Health District
VC CC Center Office
NGO

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

VA

Volunteer

Police Victim Other

V

CMAC
HU
MAPU
CBMRR

V

V

V

V

CBMRR
JSC
Arobe

V

V

V

V

JSC
FCU
CMAC
PRC
EOD
CABDIC

V

V

V
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Appendix D – Mine/UXO Casualty Data Collection Flow Chart
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Appendix E – DG Deployment and Casualties for 2005

DG's Name

Man Sa Im
(Full time)

Sex

M

Provinces

District

Banteay
Mean Chey

Malai
Ou Chrov
Mongkol
Borei

Commune
with
Casualties

Villages
with
Casualties

6
9

38
85

Serei
Sophorn
San
Bunchhoeut
(Full time)

M

Banteay
Mean Chey

Phnum Srok

Dy Kimsay
(Full time)

M

Battambang

Khim Khoeun
M
(Full time)

Battambang

M

13

162

8

59

344

28 9
42 11

37
53

90

313

0

1

1

49

6

67

8

102

8

102

0

1

1

8
6

73
71

8
6

73
71

14
24

9
0

23
24

8

76

8

76

3

12

15

4

45

4

45

10 30

40

7

49

7

49

28 15

43

Bavel

6

83

6

83

1

11

12

Kamrieng
Phnum
Proek

6

48

6

48

21

4

25

5

31

5

31

19 14

33

Sampov
Lun

6

26

6

26

7

3

10

Battambang

10

62

10

62

0

48

48

Koas Krala
Moung
Ruessei
Sangkae
Thmar Koul
Ek Phnom

6

51

6

51

3

6

9

11

111

11

111

7

4

11

10
10

63
70

10
10
7

63
70
40

0
0

2
1

2
1

12

80

12

80

0

9

9

8

72

8

72

1

0

1

7

63

7

63

0

5

5

4

24

4

24

0

3

3

15

111

15

111

0

4

4

16

173

16

173

2

8

10

9

141

9

141

0

6

6

Banan

170

188

397

98

80

71

Battambang

Batheay
Sao Leang
(Full time)

38
85

67

Rotanak
Mondol
Samlout

M

6
9

6

Preah Net
Preah
Svay Chek
Thma Puok
Hen Chham
(Full time)

Total #
Total
Total #
com#
of
Combined
2005
Total
munes villages villages
Total
Casualties
in
in
in cover
district district
area Mine UXO

Kampong
Cham

Chamkar
Leu
Dambae
Kampong
Cham
Kampong
Siem
Memot
Ponhea
Kraek

1725

61
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DG's Name Sex

Provinces

Villages
with
Casualties

Total #
communes
in
district

15
14

176
184

15
14

176
184

0
0

1
4

1
4

14

98

14

98

0

8

8

23

230

23

230

0

10

10

10

74

11
8

93
85

Krouch
Chhmar

12

76

Ou Reang
Ov

8

141
0

1

1

District

Prey Chhor
Srei Santhor
Stueng
Trang
Tboung
Khmum
Cheung
Prey
Kang Meas
Koh Sotin

Kampong
Chhnang

Nuon Srean
M
(Full time)

Kampong
Tralach
Rolea
B'ier
Sameakki
Mean Chey
Tuek Phos
Boribo
Chol Kiri
Kampong
Chhnang

10

103

13

131

0

4

4

9

86

0

1

1

8

67

0

3

3

0

1

1

Kampong
laeng

Kandal

Prey Veng

Total
Total #
2005
#
of
Combined
Total
villages villages
Total
Casualties
in
in cover Mine UXO
district
area

Commune
with
Casualties

Angk
Snuol
Kandal
Stueng
Kien Svay
Khsach
kandal
Koh Thom
Leuk Dek
Lvea Em
Mouk
Kampul
Ponnhealeu
S'ang
Takhmao
Kamchay
Mear
Baphnom
Kampong
Trabek
Kanhchriech
Me Sang
Peam Chor
Peam Ror
Pea Reang

552

9
5

51
31

4

26

9

44

16

307

16

307

28

145

28

145

0

1

1

12

46

12

46

0

2

2

18

93

12
7
15

93
24
43

11

47

14
16
6

141
119
20
0

5

5

8

129

1087

1136
9

108

13

125

8
8
9
8
12

91
118
50
41
84

27

76

Total # Total

DG's Name Sex

Provinces

District

district district

Takaev

Preah Sdach
Prey Veng
Kampong
Leav
Sithor
Kandal
Bati
Tram Kak
Treang
Angkor
Borei
Borei
Chol Sar
Kiri Vong
Koh Andet
Prey
Kambas
Samrong

15
15
14

Suos
Bunsoeun
(part time)

Auk Pon
(Full time)

Sok
Chanthach
(Main
Volunteer)

M

M

M

Kampong
Speu

Kampong
Thom

Kampot

11
11

145
142

8

42

11

60

169
246
154

Daun Keo
Phnom Penh Mean Chey

Total #
of

2005

#
Commune Villages comvillages
with
with
munes villages
in
Casualties Casualties
in
in
cover
area

1117

6

34

5

39

12
6

114
68

13

110

11

147

3

40

Total
Mine

UXO

0
0
0

3
2
2

3
2
2

0

2

2

0

1

1

1

1

Aoral

8

70

8

70

Chbar Mon
Kong Pisei
Phnum
Sruoch
Samraong
Tong
Thpong
Basedth
Odong

5
13

57
250

5
13

57
250

0
1

4
0

4
1

13

118

13

118

0

15

15

15

286

15

286

1

3

4

8

75

8
15
15

75
218
251

1

5

6

Baray

17

181

17

181

0

2

2

Sandan
Stoung
Kampong
Svay
Stueng Sen
Prasat
Balangk
Prasat
Sambo
Santuk

9
13

80
137

9
13

80
137

0
0

3
5

3
5

9

82

11

55

7

64

5

66

9

71
0

1

1

0

5

5

Kampong
Trach
Kampot
Angkor Chey

14

69

14

69

16

62

16
11

62
78

1331

736

492

Combined
Total
Casualties

31

10

6

77

DG's Name Sex

Provinces

District

Total #
Total # Total
of
#
Commune Villages comvillages
with
with
munes villages
in
Casualties Casualties
in
in
cover
district district
area

Banteay
Meas
Chhuk
Chum Kiri
Dang Tung
Kampong
Bay
Damnak
Chang Eu
Kep

Chhuon
Yada
(Main
Volunteer)

Pech Phat
(Part time)

Lim So
(Full time)

Phay Mala
(Main
Volunteer)

Botum
Sakor
M

M

Kaoh
Kong

Kracheh

M

Krong
Pailin

M

Mondol
Kiri

Yean Nora
(Full time)

M

Otdar
Mean Chey

Mok
Chantha
(Full time)

F

Otdar
Mean Chey

Kampong
Seila
Smach
Mean Chey
Kiri Sakor
Koh Kong
Mondul
Seima
Sre Ambil
Sre Ambil

15

133

14
8
10

73
37
54

6

16

3

10

3

5

2005
Total

Combined
Total
Casualties

9

Mine

UXO

1

0

1

5

24

5

24

4

13

4

13

2

5

7

3

11

3

11

0

1

1

3
4

9
11

3

12

6
4

35
16
0

4

4

0
1

4
15

4
16

19

16

35

49

18

67

0

1

1

131

Chhloung

8

40

8

40

Sambour
Snuol
Kracheh
Prek
Prasab

10
5

53
36

10
5
15

53
36
77

8

48

Pailin

4

36

4

36

Sala Krau

4

48

4

48

Kaev Seima

5

25

5

25

4

18

4

18

0

5

5

4

13

4

13

0

1

1

6

24

2

7
5

1

6

0
11

1
6

1
17

20

13

33

2

7

9

Pechr
Chenda
Saen
Monourom
Koh
Nheaek
Ou Reang
Banteay
Ampil
Chong Kal
Samraong
Trapeang
Prasat
Anlong
Veaeng

5

75

5

75

4
5

26
50

4
5

26
50

6

41

6

41

5

47

5

47

250

59

87

151

88

24

102

7

24

42

78

Total #

DG's Name Sex

Provinces

District

Total

#
comCommune Villages
with
with
munes villages
Casualties Casualties
in
in
district district

Kov Ping
(Full time)

Nguon
Monoketya
(Full time)

Yim
Kimsean
(Full time)

M

M

M

Ly Kimheng
M
(Full time)

Tim
Daravuth
(Main
Volunteer)

Khuon
Puthy
(part time)

M

M

Chhaeb
Choam
Preah Vihear
Khsant
Tbaeng
Mean chey
Kuleaen
Preah
Vihear

Pursat

Siem Reap

Stueng
Traeng

Svay
Rieng

Rovieng

Total #
of
villages
in cover area

Total

Combined
Total
Casualties

6

6

54

2005
Mine UXO

8

26

8

26

6

32

6

32

15 30

45

6

32

6

32

0

3

3

6

24

6

24

1

2

3

12

48

12

48

1

15

16

5

24

6

21
0

3

3

Sangkum
Thmei
Chey Saen

90

117

0

Bakan

10

150

10

150

Kandieng
Phnum
Kravanh
Veal
Veaeng
Krakor
Sampao
Meas
Angkor
Chum
Chi Kraeng
Prasat
Bakong
Srei Snam
Svay Leu
Varin
Angkor
Thom
Banteay
Srey
Kralanh
Pourk
Soth nikum
Siem Reap

9

113

9

113

0

1

1

7

53

7

53

0

2

2

5

20

5

20

12

2

14

11

102

7

49
0

1

1

Sesan

7

Siem Bouk
Stueng
Traeng
Thala
Barivat
Seim Pang
Kampong
Rou
Rumduol
Svay Teab
Chantrea

490

7

84

7

84

12

140

12

140

0

10

10

19

141

19

141

0

1

1

6
5
5

44
34
27

6
5
5

44
34
27

0
0
1

6
1
0

6
1
1

4

20

6

36

10
16
10
10

85
148
113
67

40

7

40

0

2

2

7

18

7

18

0

1

1

4

17

4

17

1

0

1

11

44

11

44

0

1

1

5

28
0

9

9

0
1

4
2

4
3

12

91

12

91

10
11

78
86

10
11
10

78
86
49

885

129

690

19

20

20

5

16
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DG's Name Sex

Cheng Min
(Main
Volunteer)

M

Dim Nath
(Main
Volunteer)

M

Total of
Casualties

Provinces

District

Sihanouk
Ville

Romeas
Hek
Svay Chrum
Svay Rieng
Mitta
Pheap
Prey Nob
Steung
Hav
Andoung
Meas
Ban Loung
Bar Kaev

Ratanak
Kiri

Commune
with
Casualties

Villages
with
Casualties

Total #
communes
in
district

Total #
Total
2005
of
#
Combined
Total
villages villages
Total
Casualties
in cover
in
Mine UXO
area
district

16

204

17
4

167
18

5

16

5

16

14

65

14

65

3

10

3

10

4

21

4

21

3
3

16
16

3
3

16
16

91

0

240

0

865
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Appendix F – CMVIS Volunteer Training 2000-2005

Number of Volunteers Received Training per Provinces 2000 - 2005
H_province
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Total

Banteay Mean Chey

1

50

50

101

Battambang

2

50

50

102

Kampong Cham

13

Kampong Chhnang

1

Kampong Speu

7

Kampong Thom

13

13
10

8
18

19

8

33
13

Kampot

8

2

10

Kandal

1

14

15

Kaoh Kong

19

15

34

14

26

Kracheh

1

11

Mondol Kiri

1

15

Preah Vihear

50

Prey Veaeng

1

13

Pursat

1

50

Rotanak Kiri

1

9

Siem Reap

27

Stueng Traeng

1

Svay Rieng

9

Takaev

1

Otdar Mean Chey

1

50

100
12

26

25

19

41

7

7

8

9
5

12

35

11

12

50
353

95
10

9

Krong Pailin
90

19

14

Krong Preah Sihanouk

Total

3

293

50

51

25

75
54

23

33

846
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Appendix G – CMVIS Organizational Chart 2006
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Appendix H - Sustainability Chart for CMVIS 2005

Degree to which tasks are carried out by either CMVIS, HI-B or CRC HQ

Management Administration
Logistics
Finance
Human resource
Donor reports
Budget preparation
Expenditure and follow up
budget
Operations Data gatherers
Liaison with CRC
Data collection
Data entry
Monthly report setup
Monthly report preparation
Electrical
Planning - Log Frame
Reception of guests
Project brochures
Mine/UXO Victim Annual report
Report CD
Village code checks / updates
Update data collection form
Mapping
Monitoring /
Field data
Evaluation
Database records
Data gatherer activities
Annual Seminar
Training
Volunteers
Meetings
Compact / repair
Databases
Queries / AdHoc reports
Upgrades
Mailing list
Backups
Logistics

Other

Procurement
Report Distribution
Vehicle mainenance
Office maintenance
PC / hardware / network
PC software
Assistance to Lim
Assistance in staff English
Liaison with donors
Proposal writing
Fundraising

Current Situation
CRC-HQ CMVIS-CRC
20%
80%
25%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
20%
0%
80%

20%

5%
10%
5%

100%
100%
80%
100%
100%
90%
100%
75%
50%
80%
60%
70%
0%
75%
80%
100%

Hi-B Financial Coordinator comments
HIB
0% HI-B still involved in staff recruitment
25%

30%
10% Should be 50% HI-B/50% CMVIS

0% CMVIS and HI-B are both involved 100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
10%
0%
25%
50%
20%
40%
30%
100%
25%
20%

85%
70%
85%
80%
100%
100%
60%
100%
40%
80%
50%

15%
30%
15%
20%
0%
0%
40%
0%
60%
20%
50%

70%
80%
100%
85%
60%
60%
70%
50%
25%
60%
20%

30% HI-B manages 100%
20%
0%
15%
40%
40%
30%
50%
70%
30% HI-B does 100% of work
75%

If purchase is made on HI-B budget,
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Appendix I
Sample Log
Frame

CMVIS results framework
Purpose: to support a reduction in mine/UXO
casualties in Cambodia and, ultimately, the cessation of mine/UXO related
impact on most affected communities
HOW?
Inputs

Activities
Collect data

Analyze data

Disseminate data
Staff
TA time,
can be
expressed Participate in
in person- national and
days or international fora on
months casualty gathering
Office,
equipment,
supplies

Project: CMVIS
Project time frame: five years Budget:

WHAT WE WANT?
Outputs
Comprehensive,
national information on mine/UXO
casualties and the circumstances of their
accidents, collected from relevant
geographical areas

Outcomes

WHY?
Impact

End-users make decisions
based on CMVIS information to
Useful, high quality
inform programs concerned
collection of casualty information which
with mine action and mine
reflects the information needs of end-users victim assistance
Reliable data sent out
in timely fashion to right organizations in
accessible format
Other organizations understand the CMVIS
CMVIS is internationally known
system and its benefits
Reduction of mine/UXO related impact
for its high standard on casualty
on most affected communities
data collection

VA agencies have information to provide
Collaborate with and appropriate services to victims
provide info to VA
agencies about
victims
Refer victims to
Mine/UXO accident survivors have access
services and provide to disability information and services
advocacy on their
behalf

CMVIS contributes to the
development of national and
international standards in data
gathering

Mine/UXO casualties receive
appropriate services that
contribute to increased quality
of life
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Possible indicators
Outputs
* Data collected by DGsame as during spotcheck
* Cross-referenced data with
other organizations is same
* Congruence between reporting
format and end-user organization preference
* Level of end-user satisfaction with data
* Turn-around time of special requests
* Turn-around time of special requests
* Extent to which CMVIS information
informs programming of end-users
* Increase in number of times CMVIS
is consulted by other agencies about
its system of data gathering
* Degree to which VA agencies report
CMVIS information facilitates
their provision of services to victims
* Increase in % of victims that receive services
* Increase in number of VA agencies
collaborating with CMVIS
* Degree to which CMVIS reports are readily
on hand when visiting end-user organizations
* Increase in number and diversity of services made
available to victims as a result of CMVIS
support and advocacy
* Victim reports of the benefit of
CMVIS support and advocacy

HMA & VA agencies HQ and mine/UXO
victims

Outcomes
* Increase in percentage of endusers using information to inform
their work
* Increase in the ways in which endusers use CMVIS information
* Degree to which CMVIS is
mentioned on websites of those
organizations with which it shares
lessons learned

Impact

* Increased socio-economic status
of mine/UXO casualties
* Number of children of mine/UXO * Improved socio-economic indices in mine/UXO
casualties attending school
contaminated communities

REACH
Families of mine/UXO victims
and field operations of HMA
and VA agencies

Mine/UXO contaminated
communities in Cambodia
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Appendix J – KAP Survey
CMVIS External Evaluation
Knowledge, Attitude and Practices Survey of Data Gathers
March 2006

Name: _______________________________________________________________
Province (s) responsible: ________________________________________________
Districts responsible: ___________________________________________________
Telephone number: _____________________________________________________
1. For approximately how many provinces, communes and villages are you responsible?
2. How many casualties were there in total in your coverage area in 2005?
KNOWLEDGE
3. From whom do you get casualty information? How do you know that an incident has
taken place? Explain all the people in your network that you contact to get the information
you need and with whom you stay in regular contact to ensure you are aware of all
casualties? How many days on average between the incident and you collecting the data?
4. How do you decide which victims to visit more than once to ensure your data is correct?
5. When you do not know the village code of a new village, where do you go to get it?
6. What are all your current work activities?
7. Which of these activities support mine/UXO victim and their families directly?
8. Can you think of other activities that you could do that would help mine victims and their
families even more?
9. With which agencies, NGOs and other service providers have you collaborated and
communicated in order to provide assistance to mine victims and their families in the year
2005?
10. You just began the MRE activity. What activities do you do know right now to increase
mine/UXO risk awareness of the people living in mine/UXO affected areas?
11. To whom do you distribute the monthly report?
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ATTITUDE
12. How confident are you that your casualty data is complete? Please indicate in percentage.
13. What do you think is your role in supporting mine/UXO victims and their families?
14. Can you give some examples of when you advocated for mine/UXO victims and their
families to, for example, hospitals, authorities, and NGOs?
15. Do you feel you have received enough training to give mine/UXO victims as much
direct/indirect support as possible (direct support as in information sharing, advocacy or
bringing goods, or indirect as in referral source)? If yes, what training have you received?
If not, what kind of training do you think would be helpful?
16. Do you feel you have received enough training to provide mine awareness? If yes, what
training have you received? If not, what kind of training do you think would be helpful?
17. If there are other activities that you could do that would help mine victims and their
families even more, could you do them with the resources you currently have (motor bike,
allowance, etc), or would you need additional resources?
18. How would you describe your relationship with CMVIS volunteers, other volunteers and
authorities in your network?
19. How is your workload? In other words, could you use more help from other DGs to cover
your districts, or can you cover some more villages, communes or districts?
20. Do you think women Data Gathers can be as good as men? If yes, why? If no, why?
21. How would you feel if CMVIS was no longer supported by Handicap International
Belgium and was instead supported by the Cambodian Red Cross or another agency?

PRACTICE
The following section will describe three different situations. For each of the situations, can
you explain what you would do, other than completing the data collection form, in terms of
supporting the victim and their family?
Situation 1
A father (age 37) and daughter (age 12) were injured on September 15th 2005 when the daughter
stepped on a landmine. The daughter died after three days in the hospital, while the father lived
although he lost one leg and injured the other. The family consists of a wife/mother (33) and
three other children, all boys aged 4, 8 and 9. They make a subsistence living by farming in a
minefield in Ta Taok village, Samlout district, Battambang province. They do not have any
animals.
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You as the Data Gatherer met the family one-week after the incident in the hospital and then
again two months later in their village. Since the father was injured they have not been able to
make a living and the hospital treatment left them with a big debt. He has not yet gone through
any rehabilitation, and also has not received a prosthetic leg, cane or any other equipment.
Other than completing the data collection form, what, if anything, would you do in terms of
supporting the victim (s) and their family?

Situation 2
A man (49), his wife (45) and their three children (age 16, 18 and 20) were traveling in Preah
Vihear to visit temples. The whole family lives in Phnom Penh, where the father works as quite a
successful businessman. Although they saw the mine signs, they still decided to walk off the
path. The man was walking in the front, and stepped on a mine. As a result, he lost his right leg
and had to be amputated above the knee. They returned to PP for private medical services. This is
when you meet the man and collect your information. When you check up on him two months
later, you learn that he received a prosthesis two months later from a rehabilitation centre. They
are managing quite well and he has returned to work.
Other than completing the data collection form, what, if anything, would you do in terms of
supporting the victim (s) and their family?

Situation 3
Three months ago, you met a man (39 years old) who had lost both legs due to a mine accident
while farming in a minefield. He lives in mine-affected area. BTM province. He has a wife and
seven children. Since the accident, he has been unable to support his family, and his two oldest
children are no longer able to go to school as there is no money for their school fees. To pay for
his surgery, they sold their land and house. They are now living in a tiny hut on the edge of the
minefield. You had informed the man that he could go to a rehabilitation centre to receive help
with learning daily activities and a wheel chair, and you had contacted one NGO in the provincial
town that may be able to help the family with a house, and retraining for the man so that he may
be able to support his family again. When you visit the family for the second time, you find that
he indeed went to the rehabilitation centre, but that the NGO has not yet followed up with the
family.
Would you do something? If so, what would you do?
Do you have any other comments or suggestions?
Thank you for your time. Your answers will help to make the CMVIS project even better than it
already is
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Appendix
K – DG
VA 2005

DG's name

Province

Kov Ping

Preah Vihear

Nguon Monoketya

Preah Vihear

Ly Kim Heng

Siem Reap

DGs Victim Assistance 2005
Casualty
Injury
Sex Age

Total #
casualty
73

20

1

F
2 M
3 M
4 F
5 F
6 M
7 M
8 M
9 M
10 M
11 M
12 M
13 F
14 M
15 F
16 M
17 M
18 M
19 M
20 M
21 M
22 F
23 M
24 M
25 M
26 M
27 M
28 M
29 M
30 M
31 M

47 double legs amputee
33 double legs amputee
47 double legs amputee
45 Polio
44 Her husband was killed by UXO
37 right leg amputee
38 Injured
32 Injured
died
died
died
died
died
36 Injured
35 Injured
Injured
died
42 Injured
25 Injured
31 Injured
died
28 Her husband was killed by UXO
41 Injured
46 His nephews were killed by UXO
37 His two brothers were killed by UXO
38 left hand amputee
51 hand injury, left rib broken
13 Injured
?
Injured
11 died
58 died

Service provided

Current
Partner
NGO

Household
products (HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)

CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC

Artificial hand
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)

PRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC

DG's name

Province

Total #
casualty
32
33
34
35
36
37

Suos
Bunthoeurn

Casualty
Sex
Age
F
M
M
F
M
F

Service provided

Current
Partner NGO

13 Injured
33 left leg amputee
41 Injured
13 Full Body injured
10 Full Body injured
14 Left leg injured

(HHP)
Artificial leg
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)

CRC
PRC
CRC
CRC
CRC
CRC

Injury

Kampong Speu

31

38 M

27 died

(HHP)

CRC

Mok Chantha Odor Meanchey

59

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

18 Injured
30 Injured
37 died
36 died
35 died
28 Injured
61 Injured
55 Injured
29 died

(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)
(HHP)

CRC, IFRC
CRC, IFRC
CRC, IFRC
CRC, IFRC
CRC, IFRC
CRC, IFRC
CRC, IFRC
CRC, IFRC
CRC, IFRC

Lim Sovanna

24

48 M

Two eyes are blind and two
42 hands were cut by UXO

(HHP)

CRC

Kratie

F
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M

Appendix L – HMA Interview Guide
Questions for HMA community
End-user Satisfaction
1. How would you describe the quality of collaboration your agency has with CMVIS?
2. Do you have any suggestions as to how better collaboration with CMVIS be achieved?
What benefit would your agency gain from this?
3. To what degree does CMVIS currently meet your information needs as it relates to your
ability to formulate strategy and decide on priority deployment? In what other ways does
CMVIS information benefit your agency (monitoring, planning, funding proposals, etc.)?
4. How responsive and consistent has CMVIS been to your requests for specific
information?
5. Have you provided feedback to CMVIS about their data in the past?
If yes, what kind of suggestions did you make and did you see changes in the way
CMVIS works?
If not, does this mean you are always satisfied with the data?
6. Are you aware that CMVIS has a web-site? If yes, how often do you visit it?

Reliability of CMVIS Data
7. In your opinion, how reliable is the CMVIS information? Can you give a percentage?
Indicate top ten categories for reliability check.
8. In your opinion, what are current strengths of the information provided by CMVIS?
9. In your opinion, what are current weaknesses of the information provided by CMVIS?
10. How much do you use the ‘Distance of accident site from’ data (category 4 in the CMVIS
data collection sheet)? How accurate do you need this information to be: within 100
meters, 500 meters, or 1000 meters?
11. Can you think of data sources with which CMVIS could cross-reference data?

12. Do you have any suggestions for improving the deployment scheme of CMVIS Data
Gathers and volunteers?
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Impact of CMVIS
13. In your opinion, has CMVIS maximized its possible humanitarian impact on mine action
practitioners' work given its current activities? If not, how do you think the role of
CMVIS can be expanded?
14. Should CMVIS be the agency that provides a meta-analysis of the data and make
recommendations/statements based on this analysis? If not CMVIS, which agency?
15. One of CMVIS’ goals is to provide mine victim assistance by acting as a referral source.
In your opinion, how is CMVIS performing in this regard?

Future of CMVIS
16. How would your agency respond if CMVIS were to implement a pay-for-service
subscription system as a way to raise funds for its operations?
17. If CMVIS were to ask whether your agency would be willing to contribute a staff person
to investigate and develop new funding avenues, would your agency be interested?
18. Would you be willing to contribute financially to CMVIS?

Do you have any other suggestions?
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Appendix M – Special Requests 2005

Special End-User Requests 2005
Nº Agency

Number of requests

1 CMAC

21

2 CMAA

14

3 HIB / MRT

11

4 UNICEF

10

5 MAG

9

6 NPA

8

7 MAPU

6

8 Halo Trust

5

9 JMAS

5

10 JSC

5

11 World Vision Cambodia

4

12 AUSTCARE

3

13 Cambodian Volunteers for Community Development

2

14 CMC in Japan

2

15 Ministry of Education, Youth & Sports

2

16 National Institute of Population

1

17 Social Affairs, Labor Vocational Training & Youth Rehabilitation Department

1

18 Provicial Action Mine Comity

1

19 Royal Agriculture University

1

20 United States Embassy

1

21 MPWT

1

22 CRC

1

23 Goe Special (Mau Vanna)

1

24 AFP Reporter

1

25 Ngoun Monoketya (to keep archives)

1
Total

117
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